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Abstract
Some social choice models assume that precise interpersonal comparisons of utility
(either ordinal or cardinal) are possible, allowing a rich theory of distributive justice.
Other models assume that absolutely no interpersonal comparisons are possible, or
even meaningful; hence all Pareto-efficient outcomes are equally socially desirable.
We compromise between these two extremes, by developing a model of ‘approximate’
interpersonal comparisons of well-being, in terms of an incomplete preorder on the
space of psychophysical states. We then define and characterize ‘approximate’ ver-
sions of the classical egalitarian and utilitarian social welfare orderings. We show
that even very weak assumptions about interpersonal comparability can can yield
preorders on the space of social alternatives which, while incomplete, are far more
complete than the Pareto preorder. We also develop a variant of Harsanyi’s Social
Aggregation Theorem.
The philosophical and practical problems surrounding interpersonal utility compar-
isons (IPUC) are well known; see e.g. Sen (1979), Griffin (1986), Davidson (1986), Gib-
bard (1986), Barrett and Hausman (1990), Fleurbaey and Hammond (2004), Hausmann
and McPherson (2006; §7.2), and especially Elster and Roemer (1991). The apparent
meaninglessness (or at least, practical impossibility) of IPUC has elicited at least five re-
sponses. One response is to restrict welfare economics to questions of Pareto efficiency only
(Robbins, 1935, 1938). Economists then can only recommend policies which are clearly
Pareto-superior to the status quo. If no policy alternative is Pareto-superior to any other,
then the choice between them is a ‘political’ question, and not the business of economists.
A second, opposite approach is to axiomatize that some specific form of IPUC is pos-
sible, and investigate which social choice rules arise naturally under this IPUC axiom.
This approach was pioneered by Sen (1970b), and has been spectacularly successful; see
d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002) for a summary. However, since it explicitly sidesteps the
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question of how IPUC could be possible, the resulting theoretical edifice is in danger of
being no more than an academic exercise. If someone rejects the IPUC hypotheses of the
theorems, she can dismiss their conclusions. Even if she accepts the IPUC hypotheses in
principle, she may be unable to translate an abstract social choice theorem into a concrete
policy recommendation, without some way to operationalize the required IPUC between
real people.
Thus, a third approach is to ‘pseudo-operationalize’ IPUC, by using money as a proxy
for utility. In some schemes, a policy is recommendable if it can be made Pareto-superior
to the status quo, once the ‘winners’ pay the ‘losers’ adequate financial compensation —
either hypothetical (e.g. the Kaldor-Hicks (1939) compensation principle) or actual (e.g.
the Thompson (1966) insurance mechanism). In Groves (1973)-Clarke (1971) mechanisms,
preference-strength is identified with ‘willingness to pay’; people vote for public policy by
bidding sums of money. However, such ‘money-metric utilitarianism’ favours the rich, who
tend to assign less marginal utility to each dollar than the poor (ceteris paribus), due to
risk-aversion and/or satiation. A wealthy minority can literally ‘buy’ its preferred policy
alternative by bidding a sufficiently large sum of money.
A fourth approach explicitly rejects any kind of IPUC (monetary or otherwise), and
considers social choice mechanisms which select a point on the Pareto frontier using only
the profile of individual’s (noncomparable) preferences, constrained by ‘procedural’ crite-
ria such as ‘Monotonicity’ or ‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives’. In the theory of
bargaining (i.e. social choice over a convex set, with cardinal noncomparable utility), the
Nash (1950), ‘relative-egalitarian’ (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975), and ‘relative utilitarian’
(Segal, 2000) solutions achieve this goal. However, there are other bargaining solutions
which do require explicit IPUC, and which are uniquely characterized by combinations
of axioms which may be quite desirable in some situations; see Kalai (1977) or Myerson
(1981). Thus, a rejection of IPUC does not necessarily yield desirable bargaining outcomes.
Furthermore, in the theory of voting (i.e. social choice over a discrete set, with ordinal
noncomparable preferences) Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem essentially says that there is
no ‘satisfactory’ voting rule which eschews IPUC.
A fifth approach is to altogether reject ‘welfarism’ —the idea that social choices should
be determined by utility data —and instead argue that these choices should be based
on more tangible or objective measures of quality of life, such as Rawls’ (1971) ‘pri-
mary goods’, Sen’s (1985, 1988) ‘functionings and capabilities’, Cohen’s (1993) ‘midfare’,
Roemer’s (1996) ‘advantage’, or the ‘quality-adjusted life-years’ of healthcare economics
(Tsuchiya and Miyamoto, 2009). However, this trades the problem of IPUC for another,
equally thorny problem. ‘Quality of life’ is comprised of many factors: mental and physical
health, wealth and economic opportunity, political and personal freedom, social prestige,
quality of personal relationships, etc. —and each of these factors must be split into several
subfactors to be properly quantified. But to have an appropriate object for optimization
on the part of the social planner, we must combine all of these variables into a single nu-
merical ‘index’, which purports to measure ‘overall quality of life’. What is the correct way
to define this index? Why are we justified in employing the same index for two people with
wildly different preferences and life-goals? Any attempt to answer these questions rapidly
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becomes embroiled in philosophical issues which are dangerously close to the questions of
IPUC we were trying to escape in the first place.
In reality, it does seem possible to make at least crude interpersonal comparisons. For
example, if Zara and her family and friends are physically comfortable, healthy, and safe,
while Juan and his family and friends are suffering in a concentration camp or dying of
hemorrhagic fever, it seems fairly uncontroversial to assert that Zara’s utility is higher than
Juan’s. Likewise, if Zara scores much higher than Juan in every item on a comprehensive
list of measures of health, well-being, and quality of life, then again it seems plausible that
Zara’s utility is higher than Juan’s.
Of course, if Zara, Juan and their families are in roughly equal physical circumstances,
and they both have roughly equal scores on all measures of well-being, then it is difficult
to say who is happier; such ‘high-precision’ IPUC might not be possible. However, we
will show that even even a crude, ‘low-precision’ IPUC can be leveraged to define social
preference relations which are far more complete than the Pareto ordering. Furthermore,
only such low-precision IPUC are required to decide many public policy issues; e.g. whether
to transfer wealth from the fabulously rich to the abject poor; whether to spend public
resources on emergency medical care or disaster relief; whether to quarantine a few people
to protect millions from a deadly plague, etc.
Changing minds. Some kind of IPUC is implicit whenever social policy makes ‘redis-
tributive’ choices (moving along the Pareto frontier). IPUC is also necessary when the
psychologies of the agents are themselves variables which can be modified by policy. Most
social choice models assume a fixed population of agents with fixed preferences over the set
of possible states of the (physical) world; we then seek the ‘optimal’ world-state according
to some ordering determined by these preferences. Each agent’s preferences presumably
arise from her ‘psychology’, which is assumed to be exogenous and immutable. However,
in some situations, her psychology is endogenous and mutable. For example, if the agent is
mentally ill (e.g. clinically depressed), and we provide her with appropriate therapy (e.g.
antidepressants), then she effectively becomes a slightly different person, with different
preferences (e.g. she may no longer wish to kill herself). Furthermore, different thera-
pies may lead to slightly different post-therapeutic individuals. Thus, a social choice over
psychotherapeutic alternatives necessarily involves comparing the preferences of different
people.
Another, more long-term example involves the use of propaganda campaigns to mold
public preferences. For example, in developing countries with excessive population growth,
governments sometimes try to persuade their citizens to prefer smaller family sizes. It is de-
batable whether such campaigns are successful; but if they were, then the post-propaganda
population would contain people with different preferences than the pre-propaganda pop-
ulation; furthermore, different propaganda campaigns might lead to different preference
profiles. Hence any social choice over propaganda campaigns is again a choice over worlds
containing slightly different individuals.
An even longer-term example is social choice involving future generations. Different
policies will lead to different future populations, with different psychologies and differ-
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ent preferences. For example, suppose it were discovered that a certain genetic variation
caused mild chronic depression in 20% of the population. Suppose, furthermore, that it
was possible to entirely eliminate this genetic variation from future generations through a
systematic campaign of gene therapy, thereby presumably saving 20% of all future persons
from genetically induced depression. We face a choice of whether or not to launch the gene
therapy campaign; this is a choice over two different possible futures, with two psycholog-
ically different societies. An especially acute version of the ‘future generations’ problem
confronts attempts to derive constitutions from an ‘original position’, as in Buchanan and
Tullock (1962) and Rawls (1971).
To address these issues, we introduce a space Ψ of ‘psychological types’ as well as
the usual space Φ of personal ‘physical states’. An individual’s ‘psychophysical state’
is thus an ordered pair (ψ, φ) ∈ Ψ × Φ. The element φ encodes the person’s current
health, wealth, physical location, consumption bundle, etc. The element ψ encodes the
individual’s personality, mood, knowledge, beliefs, values, desires, and any other relevant
‘psychological’ information. Thus, each ψ ∈ Ψ defines some preference order (
ψ
) over Φ.
By definition, Ψ is the space of all possible human psychologies which could ever exist;
hence the set {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ is the set of all possible preference relations which could ever be
part of any profile. A particular ‘society’ ψ ∈ ΨI is obtained by making some selection
from Ψ (here, I is set indexing the population). Societies change over time, and some of
these changes may be socially desirable. Hence, the true space of ‘social alternatives’ is
not {ψ} × ΦI for some fixed ψ ∈ ΨI . The true space of social alternatives is ΨI × ΦI ,
and it is over this space which the social planner must optimize. We refer to an element
of ΨI × ΦI as a world.
Intertemporal comparisons. Further evidence that people have at least some limited
faculty for IPUC is the fact that people remember their pasts and choose their futures.
Define a preorder (;) on Ψ, where ψ1 ; ψ2 means “ψ2 is a possible future self of ψ1”.
Equivalently: ψ2 remembers being ψ1 at some point during her past, and ψ1 anticipates
possibly becoming ψ2 at some point during her future. Thus, P(ψ) := {ψ
′ ∈ Ψ ; ψ′ ; ψ}
is ψ’s set of past selves, and F(ψ) := {ψ′ ∈ Ψ ; ψ ; ψ′} is ψ’s set of possible future selves.
If ψ has accurate memory of her own past, she can correctly make judgements of the form,
“I was happier in university than I was in high school”, or “I would be happier now to study
piano than I would have been as a teenager.” This means that she can make interpersonal
comparisons between elements of P(ψ) × Φ. On the other hand, to be able to make
optimal intertemporal choices, she must choose between various possible futures, perhaps
involving different future selves; she therefore must make accurate comparisons between
elements of F(ψ) × Φ. For example, a person choosing whether to get an education, try
a new experience, avoid ‘temptation’, undergo psychotherapy, meditate in search of ‘inner
peace’, or take a psychoactive drug (especially an addictive one) is clearly choosing amongst
possible ‘future selves’ in F(ψ). Also, the idea that people can be held partly ‘responsible’
for their preferences (e.g. for deliberately cultivating ‘expensive tastes’, for maintaining a
more or less ‘cheerful’ disposition, or for emiserating themselves with unrealistic life-goals)
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implicitly presupposes some ability to choose over F(ψ). However, once we recognize that
people routinely make interpersonal comparisons across [P(ξ)∪F(ξ)]×Φ, it seems plausible
that they can make interpersonal comparisons involving at least some other elements of
Ψ× Φ.
Contents. Section §1 deals with technical preliminaries. In §2, we introduce a model
of ‘approximate’ IPUC in a purely ordinal framework, in the form of a weak interpersonal
preference ordering (‘wipo’): a (partial) preorder on the space Ψ × Φ of psychophysical
states. In §3 (still in an ordinal setting), we use wipos to define (partial) preorders over
ΨI ×ΦI , which we call social preferences over worlds (‘sprows’). We focus on two natural
examples: the ‘Suppes-Sen’ sprow (§3.1) and the ‘approximate egalitarian’ sprow (§3.2).
In §4.1, we introduce hedometers: ordinal utility functions which are compatible with
the interpersonal comparisons determined by a wipo, and discuss when a wipo is entirely
characterized by its set of hedometers. Then, in §4.2, we study welfarist sprows, which
are obtained by coupling a social welfare ordering on RI with a collection of hedometers.
Theorem 4.6 shows that the approximate egalitarian sprow is maximal in the class of
welfarist sprows which ensure ‘minimal equity’, while being decisive between all ‘fully
comparable’ pairs of worlds (the smallest class for which one could reasonably require
decisiveness).
In §5 we turn to a cardinal utility framework. A lottery is a probability distribution
over Ψ × Φ, and a wipol is a (partial) preorder over lotteries, which satisfies something
like the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. A world-lottery is a probability measure over
the set of all possible worlds. In §5.1, we consider (partial) preorders over world-lotteries
(sprowls); we show that any sprowl must extend and refine the approximate utilitarian
sprowl, which ranks world-lotteries according to the ‘per capita average lottery’ (Theorem
5.5). If the wipol can be characterized using a set of ‘hedometers’, then the approximate
utilitarian sprowl can be interpreted as maximizing the per capita average expected value
of these hedometers on Ψ× Φ (Proposition 5.6).
In §6, we consider a rather different model of approximate interpersonal compar-
isons, obtained by treating the hedometer as a random variable. This leads to a ‘profile-
independent’ version of Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem (Theorem 6.2) and also
provides a purely ‘welfarist’ account of the importance of personal liberty (§6.2). Finally,
in §7, we construct three more mathematically complicated models of wipos, based on
specific psychological assumptions about how interpersonal comparisons could be made.
To facilitate reading, all but the simplest proofs are relegated to an appendix. It is not
necessary to read all these sections in order. The following figure illustrates the lattice of
logical dependencies between the sections.
§1 §2 §3 §4
§5 §6 §7
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Related literature. Some ideas presented here have precursors in the literature. Sen
(1970a, 1972, and Chapter 7* of 1970b) was the first to suggest using ‘approximate’ in-
terpersonal comparisons to define an incomplete social ordering over the space of social
alternatives; he developed a model quite similar to the the ‘approximate utilitarian’ sprowl
of §5.1. A similar model was recently explored by Baucells and Shapley (2006, 2008). Fi-
nally, the wipo construction in §7.3 is inspired by the ideas of Ortun˜o-Ortin and Roemer
(1991).
Fishburn (1974), Barthe´le´my (1982), and Pini et al. (2009) have also considered the
aggregation of a profile of incomplete individual preference orders into an incomplete so-
cial order; each obtained weakened versions of the classic impossibility theorems. However,
these results have no connection to this paper, because they make no reference to IPUC. In
these earlier papers, the incompleteness of preference orders represents personal ambiva-
lence, whereas in our model, it represents interpersonal incomparability (indeed, in our
model, each individual’s preferences over her physical state are complete).
1 Preliminaries
Let X be a set. A preorder on X is a binary relation () which is transitive and reflexive,
but not necessarily complete or antisymmetric. A complete order is a preorder () such
that, for all x, y ∈ X , either x  y or y  x. (For example, a social welfare order (SWO) is a
complete order on RI .) A preorder is antisymmetric (or ‘strict’) if, for all x, y ∈ X , we have
(x  y  x) ⇔ (x = y). A linear order is an antisymmetric complete order. We will assume
each individual’s preferences can be described by a complete order (not necessarily linear),
but that interpersonal comparisons can only be described by an (incomplete) preorder.
There are four distinct notions of ‘optimality’ for incomplete preorders. We define:
strDom (X ,) := {x∗ ∈ X ; x∗ is strictly dominant: x∗ ≻ x, ∀ x ∈ X \ {x∗}};
wkDom (X ,) := {x∗ ∈ X ; x∗ is weakly dominant: x∗  x, ∀ x ∈ X};
strUnd (X ,) := {x∗ ∈ X ; x∗ is strictly undominated: x∗ 6 x, ∀ x ∈ X \ {x∗}};
wkUnd (X ,) := {x∗ ∈ X ; x∗ is weakly undominated: x∗ 6≺ x, ∀ x ∈ X}.
Thus, strDom (X ,) = wkDom (X ,) ∩ strUnd (X ,)
⊆ wkDom (X ,) ∪ strUnd (X ,) ⊆ wkUnd (X ,) . (1)
All four of these optimal sets can be empty. If X is finite, then wkUnd (X ,) is al-
ways nonempty; even then, each of the other three optimal sets can sometimes be empty.
Clearly strDom (X ,) 6= ∅ if and only if wkDom (X ,) is a singleton set, in which case
strDom (X ,) = wkDom (X ,). If () is complete, then strDom (X ,) = strUnd (X ,)
and wkDom (X ,) = wkUnd (X ,). If () is antisymmetric, then strDom (X ,) =
wkDom (X ,) and strUnd (X ,) = wkUnd (X ,). If () is linear, then all four sets
are equal.
The symmetric factor of () is the relation (≈) defined by (x ≈ x′)⇔ (x  x′ and x′ 
x). The antisymmetric factor of () is the relation (≺) defined by (x ≺ x′) ⇔ (x 
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x′ and x′ 6 x). If neither x  x′ nor x′  x holds, then x and x′ are incomparable; we then
write x≻6≺ x′. If (
1
) and (
2
) are two partial orders on X , then (
2
) extends (
1
) if, for all
x, x′ ∈ X : (x
1
x′) =⇒ (x
2
x′). It follows that (x≈
1
x′) =⇒ (x≈
2
x′), while (x≺
2
x′) =⇒ (x≺
1
x′
or x≻6≺
1
x′). (In particular, every preorder is extended by the ‘trivial’ preorder where x ≈ x′
for all x, x′ ∈ X ). We say (
2
) refines (
1
) if, for all x, x′ ∈ X :(
x≺
1
x′
)
=⇒
(
x≺
2
x′
)
and
(
x≈
1
x′
)
=⇒
(
x
2
x′ or x
2
x′
)
.
That is: every pair of elements which is comparable under (
1
) remains comparable under
(
2
), and the antisymmetric part of (
2
) extends the antisymmetric part of (
1
). (Thus, if
x≈
2
x′, then either x≈
1
x′ or x≻6≺
1
x′.) For example, the ‘lexmin’ SWO refines the ‘maxmin’
SWO (see Example 4.1 below).
If (
2
) extends and refines (
1
), then for all x, x′ ∈ X , we have(
x
1
x′
)
=⇒
(
x
2
x′
)
and
(
x≺
1
x′
)
=⇒
(
x≺
2
x′
)
. (2)
Let {
λ
}λ∈Λ be a collection of preorders on X (where Λ is some indexing set). The meet of
{
λ
}λ∈Λ is the preorder (
M
) defined by (x
M
x′)⇔ (x
λ
x′, ∀ λ ∈ Λ). To clarify the meanings
of these concepts, and for later reference, we state the following facts.
Lemma 1.1 Let X be a set and let {
λ
}λ∈Λ be a collection of preorders on X .
(a) Let (
M
) be the meet of {
λ
}λ∈Λ. Then (
M
) is also a preorder on X . For every
λ ∈ Λ, the preorder (
λ
) extends (
M
) (but doesn’t necessarily refine it).
(b) Let () be a preorder on X , and suppose that, for every λ ∈ Λ, the preorder (
λ
)
extends and refines (). Then (
M
) also extends and refines ().
(c) Let (
1
) be a complete order on X , and let (
2
) be another preorder.(
(
2
) either extends or refines (
1
)
)
=⇒
(
(
2
) is also a complete order on X
)
.(
(
2
) extends and refines (
1
)
)
=⇒
(
(
2
) is identical with (
1
)
)
.
(d) Let (
1
) and (
2
) be complete orders on X . Then(
(
2
) extends (
1
)
)
⇐⇒
(
(
1
) refines (
2
)
)
.
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(e) Let (
1
) and (
2
) be antisymmetric preorders on X . Then(
(
1
) extends (
2
)
)
⇐⇒
(
(
1
) refines (
2
)
)
.
(f) Let (
1
) and (
2
) be linear orders on X . Then(
(
1
) extends (
2
)
)
⇐⇒
(
(
1
) refines (
2
)
)
⇐⇒
(
(
1
) is identical with (
2
)
)
.
(g) Let (
1
) and (
2
) be any preorders on X . [i] If (
2
) extends (
1
), then
wkDom
(
X ,
1
)
⊆ wkDom
(
X ,
2
)
and strUnd
(
X ,
2
)
⊆ strUnd
(
X ,
1
)
.
[ii] If (
2
) refines (
1
), then
strDom
(
X ,
1
)
⊆ strDom
(
X ,
2
)
⊆ wkUnd
(
X ,
2
)
⊆ wkUnd
(
X ,
1
)
.
2 Weak interpersonal preference orderings
Let Ψ be the space of psychological states, and let Φ be the space of personal physical
states. For any ψ ∈ Ψ, let (
ψ
) be a complete order on Φ, describing the preferences of
a ψ-type personality. We can also regard (
ψ
) as a (very incomplete) preorder on Ψ × Φ,
such that, for any distinct (ψ1, φ1), (ψ2, φ2) ∈ Ψ×Φ, we have (ψ1, φ1)
ψ
(ψ2, φ2) if and only
if ψ1 = ψ = ψ2 and φ1
ψ
φ2. A weak interpersonal preference ordering (or wipo) is a preorder
() on Ψ× Φ which satisfies two axioms:
(W1) (Nonpaternalism) For any ψ ∈ Ψ, the preorder () extends and refines (
ψ
). That
is: for all φ1, φ2 ∈ Φ,(
(ψ, φ1)  (ψ, φ2)
)
⇐⇒
(
φ1
ψ
φ2
)
and
(
(ψ, φ1) ≺ (ψ, φ2)
)
⇐⇒
(
φ1≺
ψ
φ2
)
.
(W2) (Minimal interpersonal comparability) For all ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Ψ, and all φ1 ∈ Φ, there
exists some φ2 ∈ Φ such that (ψ1, φ1)  (ψ2, φ2), and there exists some φ
′
2 ∈ Φ such
that (ψ2, φ
′
2)  (ψ1, φ1).
Axiom (W2) just says there exists at least one physical state (possibly very extreme) which
is clearly better for ψ2 than the physical state φ1 is for ψ1, and one physical state for ψ2
which is clearly worse for ψ2 than the φ1 is for ψ1. If () was a complete ordering on
Ψ× Φ, we would have a complete system of interpersonal utility level comparisons —but
we will presume that () is normally quite incomplete.
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The incompleteness of () can be interpreted either ‘epistemologically’ or ‘metaphysi-
cally’. In the epistemological interpretation, we suppose there is, in reality, an underlying
complete order (
∗
) on Ψ×Φ, which extends and refines (), and which describes the ‘true’
interpersonal comparison of well-being between different psychophysical states. However,
(
∗
) is unknown to us (and perhaps, unknowable). The partial preorder () reflects our
incomplete knowledge of (
∗
).
In the metaphysical interpretation, there is no underlying true, complete ordering of
Ψ × Φ; if ψ1 6= ψ2, then it is only meaningful to compare (ψ1, φ1) and (ψ2, φ2) when
they yield unambiguously different levels of well-being (e.g. because φ1 is a state of great
suffering and φ2 is a state of great happiness). The partial preorder () encodes all the
interpersonal comparisons which can be meaningfully made between different psychological
types. If (ψ1, φ1)≻6≺ (ψ2, φ2), then it is simply meaningless to inquire which of (ψ1, φ1) or
(ψ2, φ2) experiences a greater level of well-being.
A physics analogy may clarify this distinction. Suppose Ψ represents spatial position,
and Φ represents some time measurement, so that an ordered pair (ψ, φ) represents an
event which occurred at position ψ at time φ. Suppose the relation “(ψ1, φ1)  (ψ2, φ2)”
means: “The event (ψ1, φ1) happened before the event (ψ2, φ2)”. In the epistemological
interpretation, the comparison between φ1 and φ2 is subject to some ‘measurement error’,
which may depend on the distance from ψ1 to ψ2 (say, because it is difficult to determine
the exact time of occurrence of far away events). This measurement error might make it
impossible for us to determine whether (ψ1, φ1)  (ψ2, φ2) or (ψ2, φ2)  (ψ1, φ1) —but in
the setting of classical physics, one of these two statements is definitely true. However,
in the setting of special relativity, if (ψ2, φ2) occurs outside of the ‘light cone’ of (ψ1, φ1),
then neither statement is true; event (ψ2, φ2) occurred neither before nor after (ψ1, φ1).
Indeed, the words ‘before’ and ‘after’ only have meaning for events which occur inside one
another’s light cones.
We will generally remain agnostic about whether to adopt the epistemological or meta-
physical interpretation. However, some of our analysis (e.g. the concept of ‘hedometers’)
clearly tends towards the epistemological interpretation.
2.1 Weak interpersonal comparisons of utility
Suppose that Φ = R; that is, each person’s physical state can be entirely described by a
single real number (measuring her ‘well-being’ or ‘utility’). For all ψ ∈ Ψ, we suppose that
(
ψ
) is the standard linear ordering on R; however, different individuals potentially have
different ‘utility scales’, so given (ψ1, r1), (ψ2, r2) ∈ Ψ× R, it is not necessarily possible to
compare (ψ1, r1) and (ψ2, r2) if ψ1 6= ψ2. A wipo on Ψ × R is thus a weak interpersonal
comparison of utility (or wicu).
Example 2.1: Let d be a metric on Ψ (measuring the ‘psychological distance’ between
individuals).
(a) Suppose all individuals have cardinal utility functions with the same scale (so for any
ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ and r1 < r2 ∈ R, the change from (ψ, r1) to (ψ, r2) represents the same ‘increase
9
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(ψ2,r2)
(ψ1,r1)
{(ψ,r)    Ψ x R  ;  (ψ,r) > (ψ1,r1)}∋ {(ψ,r)     Ψ x R ;  (ψ,r) > (ψ2,r2)}∋
{(ψ,r)    Ψ x R ;  (ψ,r) < (ψ1,r1)}∋ {(ψ,r)     Ψ x R ;  (ψ,r) < (ψ2,r2)}
∋
R
Ψ
(ψ1,r1)
(ψ2,r2)
(a) (b)
R
Ψ
(ψ1,r1)
(c)
(ψ2,r2)
C
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D
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B
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D
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C
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0
Figure 1: Upper and lower contour sets for the wicus on Ψ×R from Example 2.1. Here, for visualization
purposes, we suppose that Ψ ⊆ R, with the Euclidean metric. (a) The wicu from Example 2.1(a), with
γ = 1/2. The contour sets are bounded by curves of the form y = ±
√
|x|. (b) The wicu from Example
2.1(a), with γ = 1. The contour sets are bounded by lines. Note that we must have γ ≤ 1 so that, if
(ψ1, r1)  (ψ2, r2), then the upper contour set of (ψ2, r2) is contained in the upper contour set of (ψ1, r1)
(as required by transitivity). (c) The wicu from Example 2.1(b). The contour sets are bounded by
exponential curves of the form y = c±x.
in happiness’ for ψ as the change from (ψ′, r1) to (ψ
′, r2) represents for ψ
′). However,
suppose the ‘zeros’ of different people’s utility functions are set at different locations (so
(ψ, 0) is not necessarily equivalent to (ψ′, 0)). The precise deviation between utility zeros
of two individuals is unknown, but it is bounded by psychological distance between them.
Formally, let c > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1) be constants. For any (ψ1, r1), (ψ2, r2) ∈ Ψ×R, stipulate
that (ψ1, r1) ≺ (ψ2, r2) iff r1+c·d(ψ1, ψ2)
γ < r2, while (ψ1, r1)≈(ψ2, r2) iff (ψ1, r1) = (ψ2, r2).
See Figure 1(a,b).
(b) Suppose all individuals have cardinal utility functions with the same zero point (so for
all ψ, ψ′, the point (ψ, 0) is equivalent to (ψ′, 0) —perhaps being the utility of some ‘neutral’
state, like nonexistence or eternal unconsciousness). However, different utility functions
have different scales. The precise deviation between utility scales of two individuals is
unknown, but it is bounded by psychological distance between them. Formally, let c > 1
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be a constant. For any (ψ1, r1), (ψ2, r2) ∈ Ψ×R, stipulate that (ψ1, r1) ≺ (ψ2, r2) if either
r1 ≥ 0 and c
d(ψ1,ψ2) · r1 < r2; or r1 < 0 and c
−d(ψ1,ψ2) · r1 < r2. Meanwhile, (ψ1, r1)≈(ψ2, r2)
iff either (ψ1, r1) = (ψ2, r2) or r1 = 0 = r2. See Figure 1(c). ♦
Now let Φ be any space of physical states, and for each ψ ∈ Ψ, let uψ : Φ−→R be a
utility function representing the preference order (
ψ
) on Φ. Let (
∗
) be a wicu on Ψ× R;
then we can define a wicu-mediated wipo () on Ψ× Φ by:(
(ψ1, φ1)(ψ2, φ2)
)
⇐⇒
(
(φ1, uψ1(φ1))∗ (φ2, uψ2(φ2))
)
. (3)
2.2 Hedometers
Suppose there was a scientific instrument which, when applied to any person, could ob-
jectively measure her current happiness or well-being in some standard units. Call this
hypothetical instrument a hedometer, and represent it as a function h : Ψ×Φ−→R. Thus,
if h(ψ, φ) < h(ψ, φ′), then psychology ψ is happier in physical state φ′ than in state φ. Thus,
the hedometer yields an ordinal utility function representing the preference ordering (
ψ
) of
any fixed psychological type ψ. However, since h objectively measures utility in standard
units, it can also be used to make interpersonal comparisons: if h(ψ, φ) < h(ψ′, φ′), then,
objectively, psychology ψ′ is happier in physical state φ′ than psychology ψ is in state φ.
Unfortunately, no such instrument exists, and even we had a putative hedometer in
front of us, there would be no way of verifying its accuracy. However, suppose we have a
collection of possible hedometers; that is, a set H of functions h : Ψ× Φ−→R such that:
• For all ψ ∈ Ψ, the function h(ψ, •) : Φ−→R is an ordinal utility function for the
preference ordering (
ψ
).
• For any (ψ, φ), (ψ′, φ′) ∈ Ψ×Φ, if (ψ′, φ′) ismuch happier than (ψ, φ), then h(ψ′, φ′) >
h(ψ, φ) (but not conversely).
One of the elements of H is the ‘true’ hedometer, but we don’t know which one. Thus, we
could define a wipo (
H
) on Ψ× Φ as follows: for all (ψ, φ), (ψ′, φ′) ∈ Ψ× Φ,(
(ψ, φ)
H
(ψ′, φ′)
)
⇐⇒
(
h(ψ, φ) ≤ h(ψ′, φ′), for all h ∈ H
)
. (4)
We will see later that many wipos can be represented in this way (§4.1).
Example 2.2: (Wipo by jury) Let J be some jury of individuals, and assume each j ∈ J
possesses a complete wipo (
j
) on Ψ×Φ, which expresses j’s own (subjective) interpersonal
comparisons of well-being. The orders {
j
}j∈J may disagree with one another (although
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all of them must satisfy axiom (W1)). Let (
J
) be the meet of the collection {
j
}j∈J ; then
Lemma 1.1(a,b) implies that (
J
) is a wipo.1
Suppose each of the complete orders (
j
) can be represented by a function hj : Ψ×Φ−→R.
Then the jury’s wipo (
J
) is defined by eqn.(4). ♦
In §7, we will develop more technically complicated examples of wipos, based on more
detailed and plausible psychological models of interpersonal comparability. First, however,
in §3-§6, we will apply wipos to make social welfare judgements.
3 Social preferences over worlds
Let I be a finite set (representing a population). A society is an element of ψ ∈ ΨI ,
which assigns a ‘psychology’ ψi to each member i of the population I. A situation is an
element φ ∈ ΦI which assigns a physical state φi to each i ∈ I. A world is an ordered
pair (ψ,φ) ∈ ΨI × ΦI —that is, a society together with a situation. If σ : I−→I is a
permutation, and (ψ,φ) ∈ ΨI × ΦI , then define
σ(ψ,φ) := (ψ′,φ′), where ψ′i := ψσ(i) and φ
′
i := φσ(i) for all i ∈ I. (5)
Let () be a wipo on Ψ × Φ. A ()-social preference over worlds (or sprow) is a preorder
(E) on ΨI × ΦI which satisfies two properties:
(ParE) For any (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈ ΨI × ΦI ,(
(ψ1i , φ
1
i )(ψ
2
i , φ
2
i ), ∀i ∈ I
)
=⇒
(
(ψ1,φ1) E (ψ2,φ2)
)
,
and
(
(ψ1i , φ
1
i )≺ (ψ
2
i , φ
2
i ), ∀i ∈ I
)
=⇒
(
(ψ1,φ1) ⊳ (ψ
2,φ2)
)
.
(AnonE) For all (ψ,φ) ∈ ΨI × ΦI , if σ : I−→I is any permutation, then (ψ,φ)
△
≈
σ(ψ,φ). (Here, (
△
≈ ) is the symmetric factor of (E)).
Axiom (AnonE) makes sense because the elements of I are merely ‘placeholders’, with
no psychological content. All information about the ‘psychological identity’ of individual
i is encoded in the ‘psychological state variable’ ψi. Thus, if (ψ
1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) are two
worlds, and ψ1i 6= ψ
2
i , then it may not make any sense to compare the welfare of (ψ
1
i , φ
1
i )
with (ψ2i , φ
2
i ) (unless such a comparison is allowed by ()), because ψ
1
i and ψ
2
i represent
different people (even though they have the same index). On the other hand, if ψ1i = ψ
2
j ,
1Note that we must require unanimous consensus in the definition of (
J
); if we merely required ma-
joritarian or supermajoritarian support [e.g. we say (ψ1, φ1)
J
(ψ2, φ2) if at least 66% of all j ∈ J think
(ψ1, φ1)
j
(ψ2, φ2)], then the relation (
J
) could have cycles.
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then it makes perfect sense to compare (ψ1i , φ
1
i ) with (ψ
2
j , φ
2
j), even if i 6= j, because ψ
1
i
and ψ2j are in every sense the same person (even though this person has different indices
in the two worlds).
Axiom (ParE) is sometimes called ‘Weak Pareto’. We might also consider sprows which
also satisfy the following ‘Strong Pareto’ property:
(SParE) For any (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈ ΨI × ΦI , if (ψ1i , φ
1
i )(ψ
2
i , φ
2
i ) for all i ∈ I, and
(ψ1i , φ
1
i )≺ (ψ
2
i , φ
2
i ) for some i ∈ I, then (ψ
1,φ1) E (ψ2,φ2).
3.1 The Suppes-Sen sprow
The Suppes-Sen sprow2 (E
s
) is defined as follows: for any (ψ,φ), (ψ′,φ′) ∈ ΨI × ΦI ,
(ψ,φ)E
s
(ψ′,φ′) if and only if there is a permutation σ : I−→I such that, for all i ∈ I,
(ψi, φi)  (ψ
′
σ(i), φ
′
σ(i)). We will see shortly that (Es ) is the ‘minimal’ ()-sprow, which is
extended (and often refined) by every other ()-sprow (see Proposition 3.4(b)).
Example 3.1: (Cost-benefit analysis)
Given two worlds (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈ ΨI×ΦI , let I↓ := {i ∈ I; (ψ
1
i , φ
1
i ) ≻ (ψ
2
i , φ
2
i )} be the
set of ‘losers’ under the change from world (ψ1,φ1) to world (ψ2,φ2), and let I↑ := {i ∈ I;
(ψ1i , φ
1
i ) ≺ (ψ
2
i , φ
2
i )} be the set of ‘winners’. Let I0 := I\(I↓⊔I↑) be everyone else. Suppose
that:
• There is a bijection g : I0−→I0 such that, for every i ∈ I0, (ψ
1
g(i), φ
1
g(i))≈(ψ
2
i , φ
2
i );
• There is an injection h : I↓−→I↑ such that, for all i ∈ I↓,
(ψ1h(i), φ
1
h(i))  (ψ
2
i , φ
2
i ) ≺ (ψ
1
i , φ
1
i )  (ψ
2
h(i), φ
2
h(i)). (6)
Thus, we can pair up every ‘loser’ i in I↓ with some ‘winner’ h(i) in I↑ such that the gains
for h(i) clearly outweigh the losses for i in the change from (ψ1,φ1) to (ψ2,φ2).
Claim 3.1*: (ψ1,φ1)E
s
(ψ2,φ2).
Proof. Define σ : I−→I as follows: σ(i) := g(i) for all i ∈ I0; σ(i) := h(i) for all i ∈ I↓;
σ(i) := h−1(i) for all i ∈ h(I↓) ⊆ I↑; and σ(i) := i for all other i ∈ I↑ \ h(I↓).
It remains to show that (ψ1i , φ
1
i )  (ψ
2
σ(i), φ
2
σ(i)) for all i ∈ I. There are three cases: (1)
i ∈ I0; (2) i ∈ I↓ or i ∈ h(I↓); and (3) i ∈ I↑ \ h(I↓).
(1): If i ∈ I0, then (ψ
1
i , φ
1
i ) ≈ (ψ
2
g(i), φ
2
g(i)) = (ψ
2
σ(i), φ
2
σ(i)) by definition of g.
(2): If i ∈ I↓ and j = h(i) ∈ I↑, then (ψ
1
j , φ
1
j)  (ψ
2
i , φ
2
i ) ≺ (ψ
1
i , φ
1
i )  (ψ
2
j , φ
2
j). However,
σ(i) = j and σ(j) = i; hence (ψ1i , φ
1
i )  (ψ
2
σ(i), φ
2
σ(i)) and (ψ
1
j , φ
1
j)  (ψ
2
σ(j), φ
2
σ(j)).
(3): If i ∈ I↑ \ f(I↓), then σ(i) = i and (ψ
1
i , φ
1
i ) ≺ (ψ
2
i , φ
2
i ); so (ψ
1
i , φ
1
i ) ≺ (ψ
2
σ(i), φ
2
σ(i)).
3 Claim 3.1*
2This sprow is based on the grading principle, a partial social welfare order defined by Suppes (1966)
on R2, and extended to Rn by Sen (1970b, §9*1-§9*3, pp.150-156). It was later named the ‘Suppes-Sen’
ordering by Saposnik (1983), who showed that, on Rn, it is equivalent to the rank-dominance ordering.
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For example, suppose I = {i, j}, fix ψi, ψj ∈ Ψ, and let φ
1,φ2 ∈ ΦI be two situations
such that φ1iψi
φ2i while φ
2
j

ψj
φ1j . Thus, a change from situation φ
1 to φ2 would help Isolde
(i) and hurt Jack (j) —thus, neither situation is Pareto-preferred to the other. Borrowing
Harsanyi’s well-known example, suppose I have an extra ticket to a Chopin concert which I
can’t use, and let φ1 be the situation where I give the ticket to Jack, while φ2 is the situation
where I give the ticket to Isolde. Both Isolde and Jack want the ticket. However Isolde
is a classical pianist and Chopin fanatic who has been complaining bitterly for months
that she couldn’t get a ticket to this sold-out concert, whereas Jack doesn’t even like
classical music; he only wants the ticket because going to any concert is slightly preferable
to spending a boring evening at home. Assume that, other than the concert issue, Jack
and Isolde have roughly similar levels of well-being. Then we might reasonably suppose
that (ψi, φ
1
i )  (ψj, φ
2
j)  (ψj, φ
1
j)  (ψi, φ
2
i ). Thus, the change from φ
1 to φ2 helps
Isolde more than it hurts Jack, so φ2 is socially preferable to φ1; hence (ψ,φ1)E
s
(ψ,φ2).
(To see this, set I↓ := {j}, I↑ := {i}, and h(j) := i in eqn.(6).) ♦
Note that we can perform the interpersonal ‘cost-benefit analysis’ in Example 3.1 with-
out even a utility function, much less a complete system of IPUC. However, even if the
wipo () is a complete ordering on Ψ × Φ, the sprow (E
s
) is still a very partial ordering
of ΨI × ΦI . In Example 3.1, the number of ‘big winners’ in I↑ must exceed the number
of losers (even small losers) in I↓, so that every loser can be matched up with some ‘big
winner’ whose gains outweigh her losses. Thus, (E
s
) might not recognize the social value
of a change φ1 ; φ2 where a wealthy 51% majority I↓ sacrifices a pittance so that des-
titute 49% minority I↑ can gain a fortune —something which classic utilitarianism would
recognize. In particular, it is necessary, but not sufficient, for a clear majority to support
the change φ1 ; φ2; thus, (E
s
) is actually much less decisive than simple majority vote.
Example 3.2: Suppose that Φ = R, as in §2.1. Then for any (ψ1, r1), (ψ2, r2) ∈ ΨI ×RI ,
(ψ1, r1)E
s
(ψ2, r2) if and only if there is a permutation σ : I−→I such that, for all i ∈ I,
(ψ1i , r
1
i )  (ψ
2
σ(i), r
2
σ(i)). Let I = {1, 2} and fix ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ Ψ
I ; then (E
s
) induces a
preorder ( ◭
s,ψ
) on R2, where, for all r, r′ ∈ R2, we have r′ ◭
s,ψ
r iff (ψ, r′)E
s
(ψ, r).
(a) Let () be the wipo on Ψ × R from Example 2.1(a), and let δ := c · d(ψ1, ψ2)
γ. Fix
r ∈ R2. For any r′ ∈ R2, r′ ◭
s,ψ
r iff either r′1 ≤ r1 and r
′
2 ≤ r2, or r
′
2 ≤ r1− δ and r
′
1 ≤ r2− δ.
See Figure 2.
(b) Let () be the wipo on Ψ × R from Example 2.1(b), and let C := cd(ψ1,ψ2). Then for
any r, r′ ∈ R2, r′ ◭
s,ψ
r iff either r′1 ≤ r1 and r
′
2 ≤ r2, or r
′
2 ≤ r1/C and r
′
1 ≤ r2/C. ♦
Example 3.3: (Bargaining problems) Let B ⊂ R2 be some compact, convex set —for
example, the set of feasible utility profiles in a bilateral bargaining problem. Let P be the
Pareto frontier of B. Classic bargaining solutions prescribe a single point on P —usually
the set of points which are weakly dominant relative to some SWO on B.
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Figure 2: Upper and lower contour sets of the relation ( ◭
s,ψ
) on R2 induced by the Suppes-Sen sprow (E
s
)
in Example 3.2(a). Each contour set contains two overlapping regions, corresponding to the two possible
conditions implying the relation r′ ◮
s,ψ
r (or vice versa).
The sprow of Example 3.2(b) generates similar pictures: simply replace ‘rj − δ’ with ‘rj/C’ and ‘rj + δ’
with ‘C rj ’ everywhere. The difference between Examples 3.2(a) and (b) is in scaling. Using the sprow of
Example 3.2(b), if we multiply r by a scalar, we see exactly the same pictures. However, using the sprow
of 3.2(a), if we multiply r by, say, 2, then the ‘incomparable’ region (right) will be only half as wide.
Fix ψ ∈ Ψ2, and let ( ◭
s,ψ
) be the preorder on R2 from Example 3.2. An incomplete preorder
like ( ◭
s,ψ
) may not have any weakly dominant points in B; instead, we consider the set
wkUnd
(
B, ◭
s,ψ
)
of points which are weakly ( ◭
s,ψ
)-undominated in B (see eqn.(1) in §1 for
definition). For any b ∈ B, we have b ∈ wkUnd
(
B, ◭
s,ψ
)
if there is no b′ ∈ B \ {b} such
that b ◭
s,ψ
b′. This means: (1) There is no b′ ∈ B which Pareto-dominates b; and (2) There
is no b′ ∈ B such that b1 < b
′
2 − δ and b2 < b
′
1 − δ.
Let P ′ be the reflection of P across the diagonal. Let P ′′ := P − (δ, δ); then b ∈
wkUnd
(
B, ◭
s,ψ
)
if (1) b ∈ P and (2) There is no b′ ∈ P ′′ which Pareto-dominates b.
The set wkUnd
(
B, ◭
s,ψ
)
is shown in Figure 3(A). ♦
Proposition 3.4 Let () be a wipo.
(a) (E
s
) is a ()-sprow.
(b) If (E) is any ()-sprow, then (E) extends (E
s
).
If (E) also satisfies (SParE), then (E) also refines (E
s
).
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Figure 3: Solving bilateral bargaining problems with sprows. (A) The Suppes-Sen bargaining solution
wkUnd
(
B, ◭
s,ψ
)
of Example 3.3. (B) The approximate egalitarian bargaining solution wkUnd
(
B, ◭
æ,ψ
)
of
Example 3.6. (C) The approximate utilitarian bargaining solution wkUnd
(
B, ◭
u,ψ
)
of Example 5.3.
(c) (Pareto Indifference) Let (E) be any ()-sprow, and let (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈
ΨI × ΦI. If (ψ1i , φ
1
i )≈(ψ
2
i , φ
2
i ), for all i ∈ I, then (ψ
1,φ1)
△
≈ (ψ2,φ2).
(d) If {E
λ
}λ∈Λ is a collection of ()-sprows (where Λ is some indexing set), and (E)
is their meet, then (E) is also a ()-sprow.
3.2 Approximate egalitarianism
Given a wipo () on Ψ×Φ, the ()-approximate egalitarian sprow (E
æ
) on ΨI×ΦI is defined
as follows: For any (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈ ΨI × ΦI ,
(
(ψ1,φ1)E
æ
(ψ2,φ2)
)
⇐⇒
(
There is a function f : I−→I (possibly not injective)
such that, for all i ∈ I, (ψ1f(i), φ
1
f(i))(ψ
2
i , φ
2
i )
)
.
In other words, for every person i in the world (ψ2,φ2), no matter how badly off, we can
find some person f(i) in the world (ψ1,φ1) who is even worse off. In particular, this means
that even the ‘worst off’ people in (ψ2,φ2) (i.e. elements of I which are ‘minimal’ with
respect to ()) are still better off than someone in (ψ1,φ1). If () is a complete ordering
on Ψ × Φ, then all people in world (ψ1,φ1) are comparable with all people in (ψ2,φ2),
and (E
æ
) is equivalent to the classical ‘maximin’ egalitarian social welfare ordering.
Example 3.5: Suppose that Φ = R, as in §2.1. Then for any (ψ1, r1), (ψ2, r2) ∈ ΨI ×RI ,
(ψ1, r1)E
æ
(ψ2, r2) iff there is a function f : I−→I (possibly not injective) such that, for all
i ∈ I, (ψ1f(i), r
1
f(i))  (ψ
2
i , r
2
i ).
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Figure 4: Contour sets for the relation ( ◭
æ,ψ
) induced on R2 by approximate egalitarian sprow (E
æ
) in
Example 3.5. Left: the upper contour sets for two choices of r ∈ R2. Middle: the lower contour sets. Each
contour set contains three overlapping regions, corresponding to the three possible conditions implying the
relation r′ ◮
æ,ψ
r (or vice versa). Right: The incomparable regions
{
r′ ∈ R2 ; r′ ◮6 ◭ r
}
. For reference, we
also show the indifference curve of the classical egalitarian (i.e. maximin) SWO.
Let I = {1, 2} and fix ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ Ψ
I ; then (E
æ
) induces a preorder ( ◭
æ,ψ
) on R2, where
r′ ◭
æ,ψ
r iff (ψ, r′)E
æ
(ψ, r). In particular, let () be the wipo of Example 2.1(a), and let
δ := c · d(ψ1, ψ2)
γ. For any r, r′ ∈ R2, r′ ◭
æ,ψ
r iff either (1) r1 ≤ r
′
1 and r2 ≤ r
′
2; or (2)
r1 ≤ r
′
1 and r1 ≤ r
′
2 − δ; or (3) r2 ≤ r
′
2 and r2 ≤ r
′
1 − δ. See Figure 4. ♦
Example 3.6: (Bargaining problems) Let B ⊂ R2 be some compact, convex set (e.g. a
bargaining set), as in Example 3.3. Let ( ◭
æ,ψ
) be the preorder on R2 from Example 3.5, and
let P be the Pareto frontier of B. Recall from Example 3.3 that the appropriate ‘bargaining
solution’ in this setting is the weakly undominated set wkUnd
(
B, ◭
æ,ψ
)
. We have:
Claim 3.6*: wkUnd
(
B, ◭
æ,ψ
)
= {b ∈ P ; |b1 − b2| ≤ δ} (see Figure 3(B)). ♦
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Given (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈ ΨI × ΦI , let I↓, I↑, and I0 be as in Example 3.1. We say
(ψ2,φ2) is a Hammond equity improvement over (ψ1,φ1) if
• There is a bijection g : I0−→I0 such that, for every i ∈ I0, (ψ
1
g(i), φ
1
g(i))≈(ψ
2
i , φ
2
i );
• There is a injection h : I↓−→I↑ such that, for all i ∈ I↓,
(ψ1h(i), φ
1
h(i))  (ψ
2
h(i), φ
2
h(i))  (ψ
2
i , φ
2
i )  (ψ
1
i , φ
1
i ). (7)
In other words, we can pair up every ‘loser’ i in I↓ with some ‘winner’ h(i) in I↑ such
that Hammond’s (1976) equity condition is satisfied: both before and after the change, i
is better off than h(i), but the change narrows the gap between them.
For example, recall the ‘concert ticket’ story from Example 3.1, but now with a different
scenario. Suppose Isolde and Jack have roughly equally strong desires to attend the concert.
However, Isolde is a miserable, depressed person, whereas Jack is a happy, contented
person. Isolde will be less happy than Jack no matter who gets the ticket; thus, we have
(ψi, φ
1
i )  (ψi, φ
2
i )  (ψj, φ
2
j)  (ψj, φ
1
j). Thus, the change from φ
1 to φ2 reduces
inequality, so it is a Hammond equity improvement. (To see this, set I↓ := {j}, I↑ := {i},
and h(j) := i in eqn.(7).)
The next result says that the approximate egalitarian sprow (E
æ
) is ‘Hammond equity
promoting’.
Proposition 3.7 For any (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈ ΨI ×ΦI, if (ψ2,φ2) is a Hammond equity
improvement over (ψ1,φ1), then (ψ1,φ1)E
æ
(ψ2,φ2).
Proof. Let g : I0−→I0 and h : I↓−→I↑ be as in eqn.(7). Define f : I−→I as follows: For
all i ∈ I0, let f(i) := g(i). For all i ∈ I↓, let f(i) := h(i). For all i ∈ I↑, let f(i) = i.
Then clearly, for all i ∈ I, we have (ψ1f(i), φ
1
f(i))  (ψ
2
i , φ
2
i ); hence (ψ
1,φ1)E
æ
(ψ2,φ2), as
desired. 2
4 Hedometry and Welfarism
4.1 Hedometers
Let X be a set and let () be a preorder on X . A weak utility function for () is a function
u : X−→R which is ‘nondecreasing’ in the following sense:
For all x, y ∈ X ,
(
x  y
)
=⇒
(
u(x) ≤ u(y)
)
. (8)
It follows that
(
x≈y
)
⇒ (u(x) = u(y)). Note that (8) is a rather weak requirement
—for example, any constant function is a weak utility function. A strong utility function
(or Richter-Peleg function) is a function u : X−→R which satisfies (8) and also satisfies:
For all x, y ∈ X ,
(
x ≺ y
)
=⇒
(
u(x) < u(y)
)
. (9)
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Under mild hypotheses, preorders on topological spaces admit continuous strong utility
functions (Richter, 1966; Peleg, 1970),3 or semicontinuous strong utility functions (Jaffray,
1975; Sondermann, 1980). Likewise, if a preorder on a space of lotteries satisfies versions of
the vNM axioms of ‘Linearity’ and ‘Continuity’, then it has a linear strong utility function
(Aumann, 1962).
As observed by Evren and Ok (2009), every preorder () admits a weak multiutility
representation. That is, there is a set U of weak utility functions for () such that
For all x, y ∈ X ,
(
x  y
)
⇐⇒
(
u(x) ≤ u(y), for all u ∈ U
)
. (10)
(For example: for all x ∈ X , define ux : X−→R by ux(y) := 1 if y  x and ux(y) := 0 if
y 6 x; then it is easy to see that U := {ux ; x ∈ X} is a weak multiutility representation.)
Unfortunately, such a representation will not be sufficient for our purposes, because every
element of U may violate statement (9).
A strong multiutility representation for () is a set U of strong utility functions for ()
which satisfies statement (10). Preorders admit such representations under fairly mild
hypotheses. For example, suppose () is separable, meaning there is a countable subset
Y ⊆ X which is dense (i.e. for all x ≺ z ∈ X , there exists some y ∈ Y such that x ≺ y ≺ z);
then () has a strong multiutility representation (Mandler, 2006, Thm.1). Furthermore, if
X is a locally compact separable metric space and () is a continuous preorder, then ()
admits a strong multiutility representation comprised entirely of continuous strong utility
functions (Evren and Ok, 2009, Corollary 1).4
Now let () be a wipo on Ψ × Φ. Motivated by the scenario of §2.2, we will refer to
a strong utility function for () as a hedometer. That is, a hedometer for () is a func-
tion h : Ψ×Φ−→R such that, for all (ψ1, φ1), (ψ2, φ2) ∈ Ψ×Φ,
(
(ψ1, φ1)  (ψ2, φ2)
)
=⇒(
h(ψ1, φ1) ≤ h(ψ2, φ2)
)
and
(
(ψ1, φ1) ≺ (ψ2, φ2)
)
=⇒
(
h(ψ1, φ1) < h(ψ2, φ2)
)
. LetHED()
be the set of hedometers for (). We say that () is hedometric if it has a strong multiu-
tility representation (10), with U = HED(). The aforementioned results imply that wipos
are hedometric under broad hypotheses, and that HED() itself is nonempty under even
broader hypotheses.
3See also Levin (1983a,b, 1984, 2000), Mehta (1986), Herden (1989a,b,c, 1995), and the monographs
by Nachbin (1965) and Bridges and Mehta (1995).
4Mandler’s (2006) result is formulated in terms of weak multiutility representations, but an examination
of the proof reveals that it actually establishes a strong multiutility representation. Ok (2002) and Evren
and Ok (2009) have also constructed strong multiutility representations for topological preorders using
semicontinuous utility functions, as well as sufficient conditions for the set U in (10) to be finite; see
also Yılmaz (2008). Evren and Ok (2009) have also established the existence of (semi)continuous weak
multiutility representations for topological preorders. Much earlier, Dushnik and Miller (1941) showed
that any irreflexive partial order was the intersection of all its linear extensions; this result was extended
to preorders by Donaldson and Weymark (1998), and to a very broad class of binary relations by Duggan
(1999). However, the linear extensions involved in these intersections cannot generally be represented by
utility functions. Finally, Stecher (2008, Thm.2) provides conditions under which a strict partial order
(≺) on X can be represented by an ‘interval-valued’ utility function. This means there is a collection U of
Q-valued utility functions such that, for all x, y ∈ X , if x ≺ y, then u(x) < v(y) for all u, v ∈ U (but the
converse might not hold).
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4.2 Welfarism
A social welfare order (SWO) is a complete preorder (◭) on RI satisfying two axioms:
(Par◭) For any r, r′ ∈ RI , if ri ≤ r
′
i for all i ∈ I, then r◭r
′. If ri < r
′
i for all i ∈ I, then
r◭ r′.
(Anon◭) If σ : I−→I is any permutation, and r ∈ RI , then r
N
≈ σ(r).
Example 4.1: (a) The egalitarian SWO (◭
e
) is defined as follows. For all r1, r2 ∈ RI ,
r1◭
e
r2 if and only if min
i∈I
(r1i ) ≤ min
i∈I
(r2i ). (Thus, r
1
N
≈
e
r2 whenever min
i∈I
(r1i ) = min
i∈I
(r2i ).)
(b) Suppose I := [1...I]. Let
ր
RI :=
{
r ∈ RI ; r1 ≤ r2 ≤ · · · ≤ rI
}
. For any r ∈ RI , let
ր
r ∈
ր
RI be the element obtained by arranging the entries of r in ascending order —e.g.
ր
r1 := mini∈I ri and
ր
rI := maxi∈I ri. For any k ∈ [1...I], the rank k dictatorship SWO (◭
k
)
is defined on RI by r◭
k
r′ iff
ր
rk ≤
ր
r′k (thus, (◭e ) is the rank 1 dictatorship).
(c) The lexmin SWO (◭
lex
) is defined as follows: r1◭
lex
r2 iff there exists some j ∈ [1...I] such
that
ր
rk =
ր
r′k for all k ∈ [1...j), while
ր
rj <
ր
r′j. Meanwhile, r
1
N
≈
lex
r2 iff r1 = r2. ♦
For any (ψ,φ) ∈ ΨI × ΦI and function h : Ψ × Φ−→R, we define h(ψ,φ) :=
(h(ψi, φi))i∈I ∈ R
I .
Proposition 4.2 Let () be a wipo on Ψ × Φ. Let (◭) be a complete preorder on RI
satisfying axiom (Par◭), and let h : Ψ×Φ−→R be some function. Define the preorder (E
h
)
on ΨI × ΦI by (ψ,φ)E
h
(ψ′,φ′) iff h(ψ,φ)◭h(ψ′,φ′). Then(
E
h
is a ()-sprow
)
⇐⇒
(
h ∈ HED() and (◭) is a SWO
)
.
Corollary 4.3 Let () be a wipo on Ψ × Φ, and let H ⊆ HED() be some collection of
hedometers. Let (◭) be a SWO on RI, and define the preorder (E
H
) on ΨI × ΦI by(
(ψ,φ)E
H
(ψ′,φ′)
)
⇐⇒
(
h(ψ,φ) ◭ h(ψ′,φ′), for all h ∈ H
)
.
Then (E
H
) is a ()-sprow.
Proof. Combine Proposition 4.2 with Lemma 3.4(d). 2
The set HED() generally contains many possible hedometers, which could yield dif-
ferent, contradictory sprows in Proposition 4.2. Corollary 4.3 mitigates this problem by
requiring ‘unanimity’ over some ‘representative sample’ H of hedometers. What consti-
tutes a representative sample? The most conservative choice would be to set H = HED().
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Thus, for any SWO (◭) on RI , the (,◭)-welfarist5 sprow (E) is defined as follows: for all
(ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈ ΨI × ΦI ,(
(ψ1,φ1)E(ψ2,φ2)
)
⇐⇒
(
For all h ∈ HED(), h(ψ1,φ1)◭h(ψ2,φ2)
)
. (11)
The welfarist sprow (11) seems most plausible when () is hedometric, but it is well-defined
whenever HED() 6= ∅.
Proposition 4.4 Let () be a hedometric wipo. Let (◭
e
) be the egalitarian SWO in Ex-
ample 4.1(a). The (,◭
e
)-welfarist sprow is the approximate egalitarian sprow (E
æ
) from
§3.2. In other words, for any (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈ ΨI × ΦI,(
(ψ1,φ1)E
æ
(ψ2,φ2)
)
⇐⇒
(
min
i∈I
h(ψ1i , φ
1
i ) ≤ min
i∈I
h(ψ2i , φ
2
i ), ∀ h ∈ HED()
)
.
In general, a ()-sprow will be a very incomplete preorder on ΨI × ΦI , because ()
itself is an incomplete preorder of Ψ× Φ. Say that two worlds (ψ,φ), (ψ′,φ′) ∈ ΨI × ΦI
are fully ()-comparable if the set {(ψi, φi)}i∈I ∪ {(ψ
′
i, φ
′
i)}i∈I is totally ordered by ().
(For example, fix ψ ∈ Ψ, and suppose (ψ,φ) and (ψ′,φ′) are ‘ψ-clone worlds’ where
ψi = ψ
′
i = ψ for all i ∈ I; then (ψ,φ) and (ψ
′,φ′) are fully ()-comparable). In this case,
a ()-sprow really has no excuse for failing to order (ψ,φ) relative to (ψ′,φ′), since every
element of {(ψi, φi)}i∈I is ()-comparable to every element of {(ψ
′
i, φ
′
i)}i∈I . A ()-sprow
(E) is minimally decisive if (ψ,φ) and (ψ′,φ′) are (E)-comparable whenever they are fully
()-comparable.
Example 4.5: The approximate egalitarian sprow (E
æ
) (see §3.2) is minimally decisive.
To see this, suppose (ψ1,φ1) and (ψ2,φ2) are fully ()-comparable. Then there exists
some m ∈ {1, 2} and some j ∈ I such that (ψmj , φ
m
j )  (ψ
n
i , φ
n
i ) for all (n, i) ∈ {1, 2} × I.
Suppose m = 1, and define f : I−→I by f(i) = j for all i ∈ I; then we have (ψ1f(i), φ
1
f(i)) =
(ψ1j , φ
1
j)  (ψ
2
i , φ
2
i ) for all i ∈ I; hence (ψ
1,φ1)E
æ
(ψ2,φ2). ♦
We will now show that very few welfarist sprows are minimally decisive, and among
these, only the approximate egalitarian sprow has a desirable ‘equity’ property. To explain
this, suppose (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈ ΨI × ΦI are fully ()-comparable. The rank structure
of the pair ((ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2)) is the complete order (⋖) on {1, 2} × I defined as follows:
for all n,m ∈ {1, 2} and i, j ∈ I, (n, i)⋖(m, j) if and only if (ψni , φ
n
i )(ψ
m
j , φ
m
j ). We will
require the following axiom of ‘minimal richness’ for ():
5A weaker form of ‘welfarism’ simply requires the social ordering of two worlds to be entirely determined
by the pattern of individual preferences between those worlds; this follows from ‘Pareto Indifference’, which
holds for any sprow, by Proposition 3.4(c). We here use ‘welfarism’ in the stronger sense employed by Sen
(1970b) and d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002): the social ordering is determined by comparing the values
of the individual’s utility functions (or in this case, a hedometer) on the the two worlds. For a detailed
discussion of this distinction, see (d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002, §3.3.1, p.489-494)
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(MR) For any complete order (⋖) on {1, 2}×I, there exist fully ()-comparable (ψ1,φ1)
and (ψ2,φ2) in ΨI × ΦI whose rank structure is (⋖).
This is a very mild condition, which is satisfied by almost any collection of preferences.
For example, suppose there exists some subset Φ′ ⊆ Φ with |Φ′| ≥ 2×|I|, and some ψ ∈ Ψ
such that (
ψ
) is a strict ordering of Φ′; then () satisfies (MR). (Let ψ and ψ′ be ‘ψ-clone
societies’ with ψi = ψ
′
i = ψ for all i ∈ I; then pick {φi}i∈I and {φ
′
i}i∈I from Φ
′ to obtain
any desired rank structure).
We will use the following ‘minimal’ version of Hammond’s equity condition:
(MinEqE) There exist (ψ,φ), (ψ′,φ′) ∈ ΨI × ΦI and i, j ∈ I such that:
(q1E) (ψi, φi) ≺ (ψ
′
i, φ
′
i)  (ψ
′
j, φ
′
j) ≺ (ψj, φj).
(q2E) (ψi, φi)  (ψk, φk) ≈ (ψ
′
k, φ
′
k) for all k ∈ I \ {i, j}; and
(q3E) (ψ,φ)E(ψ′,φ′).
We now come to the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.6 Let () be a wipo on Ψ × Φ which satisfies (MR), with HED() 6= ∅. Let
(◭) be a SWO on RI, and let (E) be the (,◭)-welfarist sprow on ΨI × ΦI.
(a) (E) is minimally decisive if and only if (◭) refines a rank dictatorship SWO
[Example 4.1(b)].
(b) If (E) is minimally decisive and satisfies (MinEq), then (E) is extended by the
approximate egalitarian sprow (E
æ
).
(c) If (E) refines (E
æ
), then (E) is minimally decisive and satisfies (MinEq).
(d) (E) extends (E
æ
) if and only if (E) is (E
æ
).
Example 4.7: Let (◭
lex
) be the lexmin SWO [Example 4.1(c)], and let (E
lex
) be the (,◭
lex
)-
welfarist sprow. Then (E
lex
) is minimally decisive (by Lemma 4.9 in the Appendix) and
satisfies (MinEq). If (ψ1,φ1)E
lex
(ψ2,φ2), then h(ψ1,φ1)◭
lex
h(ψ2,φ2) for all h ∈ HED();
hence h(ψ1,φ1)◭
æ
h(ψ2,φ2) for all h ∈ HED(), so (ψ1,φ1)E
æ
(ψ2,φ2). Thus, (E
æ
) extends
(E
lex
). ♦
Let W() be the set of all welfarist sprows for the wipo (), and consider the partial
order relation “⊆” on W() (i.e. (E
1
) ⊆ (E
2
) iff (E
2
) extends (E
1
)). If () is hedometric
then Proposition 4.4 says that (E
æ
) ∈ W(). In this case, Theorem 4.6(d) says that (E
æ
)
is a local (⊆)-maximum in W(), while Theorem 4.6(b) says that (E
æ
) is the global (⊆)-
maximum for the set of minimally decisive and minimally equitable elements of W().
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However, Theorem 4.6 applies even when () is not hedometric (so (E
æ
) itself might not
be in W()).
Let X ⊂ ΨI × ΦI be some set of ‘feasible’ worlds, and suppose the social planner
wishes to find the (E)-optimal world in X . If (E) is welfarist, minimally decisive, and
minimally equitable, then Lemma 1.1(g)[i] and Theorem 4.6(b) imply that wkDom (X ,E) ⊆
wkDom
(
X ,E
æ
)
and strUnd
(
X ,E
æ
)
⊆ strUnd (X ,E). In particular, if there is a unique
weakly (E
æ
)-dominant feasible world (ψ,φ) in X , then (ψ,φ) is the only possible weakly
(E)-dominant feasible world in X . On the other hand, any strictly (E
æ
)-undominated
feasible world is also strictly (E)-undominated.
Suppose further that X is small enough that (E) is a complete ordering when re-
stricted to X . Then (E
æ
) is also complete on X (by Lemma 1.1(c)), and hence (E) refines
(E
æ
) (by Lemma 1.1(d)). Thus, Lemma 1.1(g)[ii] says strDom
(
X ,E
æ
)
⊆ strDom (X ,E) ⊆
wkUnd (X ,E) ⊆ wkUnd
(
X ,E
æ
)
. In particular, any bargaining solution proposed by (E)
must be a subset of the approximate egalitarian bargaining solution described in Example
3.6 and portrayed in Figure 3(b).
Remark. Define a ‘weak hedometer’ to be any weak utility function for () [i.e. a
function u : Ψ×Φ−→R which satisfies statement (8) but not necessarily (9)]. Then every
wipo is ‘weakly hedometric’, in the sense that statement (10) is always true when we take
U to be the set of all weak hedometers. Thus, if we defined a ‘weakly welfarist sprow’ by
replacing HED() with the set of all weak hedometers in defining formulae (11), then we
would have a concept applicable to any wipo. However, Proposition 4.2 warns that the
resulting social order may not always be a sprow. Proposition 4.4 is still true (the proof
does not use (9)]. However, the proof of Theorem 4.6 breaks down if (9) is violated.
5 Weak interpersonal comparisons of lotteries
The theory of wipos and sprows developed in sections 2-4 cannot model decision-making
under uncertainty. We now remedy this. Let P(Φ) be the space of probability distributions
over Φ (with respect to some sigma algebra on Φ). For all ψ ∈ Ψ, let (
ψ
) be a complete
preorder on P(Φ) which satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern (‘vNM’) axioms. (Thus,
(
ψ
) could be represented as maximizing the expected value of a cardinal utility function).
Let P(Ψ) be the space of probability distributions over Ψ (with respect to some sigma
algebra on Ψ), and let P(Ψ×Φ) be the space of lotteries —that is, probability measures on
the product sigma algebra on Ψ×Φ. For any δ ∈ P(Ψ) and ρ ∈ P(Φ), let δ⊗ ρ ∈ P(Ψ×Φ)
denote the unique lottery over Ψ × Φ such that (δ ⊗ ρ)(Ψ′ × Φ′) = δ(Ψ′) · ρ(Φ′) for all
measurable subsets Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ and Φ′ ⊆ Φ.
Let P ⊆ P(Ψ×Φ) be a convex set of lotteries. A weak interpersonal preference order over
lotteries (or wipol) is a preorder () on P which satisfies the following axioms:
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(Nonpat) (Nonpaternalism) For all µ ∈ P(Ψ) and ρ1, ρ2 ∈ P(Φ), if µ ⊗ ρ1 and µ ⊗ ρ2
are in P, and if µ
{
ψ ∈ Ψ ; ρ1
ψ
ρ2
}
= 1, then µ⊗ ρ1  µ⊗ ρ2.
(Lin) (Linearity) For all ρ, ρ′1, ρ
′
2 ∈ P and s, s
′ ∈ (0, 1) with s + s′ = 1,
(
ρ′1  ρ
′
2
)
=⇒(
(sρ+ s′ρ′1)  (sρ+ s
′ρ′2)
)
.
Axiom (Lin) is a version of the standard vNM linearity axiom. To illustrate (Nonpat),
fix ψ ∈ Ψ, and let δψ ∈ P(Ψ) be the ‘sure thing’ distribution such that δψ{ψ} = 1. If δψ⊗ρ1
and δψ ⊗ ρ2 are in P, then (Nonpat
) implies a more familiar ‘Nonpaternalism’ condition
similar to (W1): (
δψ ⊗ ρ1  δψ ⊗ ρ2
)
⇐⇒
(
ρ1
ψ
ρ2
)
.
The intuitive arguments for the existence of a wipol on P parallel the arguments made
in the introduction for the existence of a wipo on Ψ × Φ: we have some (limited) ability
to compare the welfare of people in different psychophysical states —especially when these
are our own potential future psychophysical states —and this ability should extend to some
ability to compare the welfare of people confronting lotteries over psychophysical states.
Example 5.1: For any ρ ∈ P(Ψ×Φ) and measurable function h : Ψ× Φ−→R, we define
h∗(ρ) :=
∫
Ψ×Φ
h(ψ, φ) dρ(ψ, φ). (12)
Let H be a collection of functions h : Ψ × Φ−→R such that, for every ψ ∈ Ψ and every
h ∈ H, the function h(ψ, •) : Φ−→R is a vNM cardinal utility function representing (
ψ
).
Define the ordering () on P as follows: for any ρ, ρ′ ∈ P,(
ρ  ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(
h∗(ρ) ≤ h∗(ρ′) for all h ∈ H
)
. (13)
Then () is a wipol on P. (In §5.2 we will see that many reasonable wipols can be
represented in this fashion.) ♦
5.1 Social preferences over world lotteries
Any policy chosen by the social planner will result in a world-lottery: a probability distri-
bution ρ over ΨI × ΦI . To decide the ‘best’ policy, the social planner must formulate a
preference relation (E) over P(ΨI×ΦI). For any world-lottery ρ ∈ P(ΨI×ΦI), and any
i ∈ I, let ρi ∈ P(Ψ×Φ) be the lottery on the ith coordinate induced by ρ. That is, for any
measurable subset U ⊂ Ψ× Φ,
ρi[U ] := ρ
{
(ψ,φ) ∈ ΨI × ΦI ; (ψi, φi) ∈ U
}
. (14)
For any convex subset P ⊆ P(Ψ×Φ), let P⊗I :=
{
ρ ∈ P(ΨI×ΦI) ; ρi ∈ P, ∀ i ∈ I
}
; this
is a convex subset of P(ΨI×ΦI).
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If σ : I−→I is any permutation, define σ : ΨI ×ΦI−→ΨI ×ΦI as in eqn.(5). For any
ρ ∈ P(ΨI×ΦI), we define σ(ρ) = ρ′ as follows:
For any measurable subset U ⊆ ΨI × ΦI , ρ′[U ] := ρ
[
σ−1(U)
]
. (15)
It is easy to check that σ[P⊗I ] = P⊗I . If () is a wipol on P, then a ()-social prefer-
ence order over world-lotteries (or ()-sprowl) is a preorder (E) on P⊗I with the following
properties:
(ParE) For all ρ,ρ′ ∈ P⊗I , if ρi  ρ
′
i for all i ∈ I, then ρEρ
′. Also, if ρi ≺ ρ
′
i for all
i ∈ I, then ρ ⊳ρ′.
(AnonE) If σ : I−→I is any permutation, then for all ρ ∈ P⊗I , ρ
△
≈ σ(ρ).
(LinE) For all ρ1,ρ2,ρ
′
1,ρ
′
2 ∈ P
⊗I , and s, s′ ∈ [0, 1] with s+ s′ = 1, if ρ1Eρ2 and ρ
′
1Eρ
′
2,
then (sρ1 + s
′ρ′1)E (sρ2 + s
′ρ′2).
Axioms (ParE) and (AnonE) are the world-lottery versions of the eponymous axioms in
§3. Axiom (LinE) is just the von Neumann-Morgenstern linearity axiom.
Fix a world-lottery ρ ∈ P⊗I . For all i ∈ I, let ρi ∈ P be as in eqn.(14). Define the
per capita average lottery
ρ :=
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
ρi ∈ P. (16)
The approximate utilitarian ()-sprow (E
u
) is then defined:
∀ρ,ρ′ ∈ P⊗I ,
(
ρE
u
ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(
ρ  ρ′
)
. (17)
For example, suppose () is defined in terms of a family H of ‘utility functions’ h :
Ψ × Φ−→R, as in Example 5.1. For any h ∈ H, clearly, h∗(ρ) = 1
|I|
∑
i∈I h
∗(ρi) is the
per capita average expected value of h in the world-lottery described by ρ. Thus, combining
statements (13) and (17) yields:(
ρE
u
ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(∑
i∈I
h∗(ρi) ≤
∑
i∈I
h∗(ρ′i), for all h ∈ H
)
. (18)
Corollary 5.6 (below) shows that, for many reasonable wipols, the approximate utilitarian
sprowl can be represented as in (18).
Example 5.2: Fix ψ ∈ ΨI . Then (E
u
) induces a preference order (E
u,ψ
) on P(ΦI), where,
for all ρ,ρ′ ∈ P(ΦI) (
ρE
u,ψ
ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(
(δψ ⊗ ρ)E
u
(δψ ⊗ ρ
′)
)
. (19)
(Here δψ ∈ P(Ψ
I) is the ‘sure thing’ probability measure with δψ{ψ} = 1).
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Figure 5: Contour sets for the relation ( ◭
u,ψ
) induced on R2 by approximate utilitarian sprowl (E
u
) in
Example 5.2 Left: the upper contour set of r. Middle: the lower contour set of r. Each contour set
contains three disjoint regions, corresponding to the three possible conditions implying the relation r′ ◮
u,ψ
r
(or vice versa). Right: The incomparable regions
{
r′ ∈ R2 ; r′ ◮6 ◭ r
}
. For reference, we also show the
indifference curve of the classical utilitarian SWO.
If the wipol () is defined in terms of a family H of utility functions, as in Example 5.1,
then statements (18) and (19) together become:(
ρE
u,ψ
ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(∑
i∈I
h(ψi, ρi) ≤
∑
i∈I
h(ψi, ρ
′
i), for all h ∈ H
)
. (20)
[Here, we define h(ψ, ρ) := h∗(δψ ⊗ ρ) for all ψ ∈ Ψ and ρ ∈ P(Φ), where h
∗ is as in
eqn.(12).]
Fix h0 ∈ H. For all h ∈ H and i ∈ I, there exist constants wi = wi(h) ∈ R+ and
bi = bi(h) ∈ R such that, for all φ ∈ Φ, we have h(ψi, φ) = wi ·h0(ψi, φ)+bi (because both
h(ψi, •) and h0(ψi, •) are vNM cardinal utility functions for (
ψi
)). For any h ∈ H, define
the ‘weight vector’ w(h) := (wi(h))i∈I ∈ R
I
+. Next, define W := {w(h) ; h ∈ H} ⊆ R
I
+.
Then statement (20) becomes:(
ρE
u,ψ
ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(∑
i∈I
wi · h0(ψi, ρi) ≤
∑
i∈I
wi · h0(ψi, ρ
′
i), for all w ∈ W
)
. (21)
(The constants {bi(h)}i∈I are irrelevant because they cancel from both sides of the right-
hand inequality in (20), for any fixed h ∈ H.)
In particular, suppose I = {1, 2}; then W ⊆ R2+. Let A := inf {w1/w2 ; w ∈ W} and
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A := sup {w1/w2 ; w ∈ W}. As shown in Figure 5, we define a preorder ( ◭
u,ψ
) on R2 by:
(
r ◭
u,ψ
r′
)
⇐⇒
either (A) r′1 ≥ r1 and r′2 ≥ r2;or (B) r′1 ≥ r1, r′2 ≤ r2 and S ≥ −A;
or (C) r′1 ≤ r1, r
′
2 ≥ r2, and S ≤ −A
 , where S := r′2 − r2
r′1 − r1
. (22)
(That is, S is the slope of the line through r and r′.) We have:
Claim 5.2*: Let ρ,ρ′ ∈ P(ΦI), and for i ∈ {1, 2}, let ri := h0(ψi, ρi) and r
′
i := h0(ψi, ρ
′
i),
to obtain vectors r and r′ in R2. Then
(
ρE
u,ψ
ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(
r ◭
u,ψ
r′
)
. ♦
Example 5.3: (Bargaining problems) Let B ⊂ R2 be some compact, convex set (e.g. a
bargaining set), as in Example 3.3. Let ( ◭
u,ψ
) be the preorder on R2 from Example 5.2. If
b ∈ B, then b is weakly ( ◭
u,ψ
)-undominated iff the wedge
{
r′ ∈ R2 ; r′ ◮
u,ψ
r
}
intersects B
only at b. Thus, if P is the Pareto frontier of B, then wkUnd
(
B, ◭
u,ψ
)
⊆ P. Furthermore,
if b ∈ P, and T is the slope of the tangent line to P at b, then b ∈ wkUnd
(
B, ◭
u,ψ
)
iff
−A ≤ T ≤ −A.6 The set wkUnd
(
B, ◭
u,ψ
)
is shown in Figure 3(C). ♦
Remark 5.4. ‘Approximate utilitarian’ social orderings defined like formula (18) have
appeared at least twice before in the literature. Sen (1970a, 1972, and Chapt. 7* of
1970b) defined partial social orderings over a space X of social alternatives (not necessar-
ily lotteries) by computing weighted utilitarian sums for all weight vectors in some convex
cone W ⊆ RI+, as in (21). Under certain axioms, he showed that one could define a one-
parameter family {
α
}α∈[0,1] of such social orderings, where (
0
) is the Pareto ordering (no
comparability), and (
1
) is the classic utilitarian SWO (full comparability). (Indeed, Sen
explicitly motivates his approach as an attempt to compromise between these extremes.)
If 0 ≤ α < β ≤ 1, then Wβ ⊂ Wβ, so that (
β
) extends and refines (
α
), and represents
a greater degree of interpersonal comparability (e.g. in Figure 5(C), the grey noncompa-
rability wedges for (
β
) are thinner than those for (
α
)). Unfortunately, aside from Fine
(1975), there seems to have been little followup on Sen’s idea.
More recently, Baucells and Shapley (2006, 2008) have developed a theory which assigns,
to every subcoalition J ⊆ I, a (partial) preorder (◭
J
) on a space P(X ) of lotteries over
some set X . They impose the Extended Pareto Rule (EPR): For any ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(X ), and any
two disjoint coalitions J ,K ⊂ I, if ρ◭
J
ρ′ and ρ◭
K
ρ′, then ρ ◭
J⊔K
ρ′. Using a theory of lottery
hedometers (see §5.2 below), they argue that all coalitions must have preference orderings
defined by cones of utility functions, as in (18). In particular, two-person coalitions must
have preference orderings as in formula (22): for any i, j ∈ I, there exists constants
Aij ≥ Aij > 0 providing upper and lower bounds for the ‘conversion rates’ from i’s vNM
6If b is a corner point of P, then this inequality must hold for all tangent lines at b.
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utility function to j’s vNM utility function. Baucells and Shapley (2008, §2.5) then show
that, for any distinct i, j, k ∈ I, EPR imposes an interesting ‘no arbitrage’ condition on
the conversion rates for the pairs {i, j}, {j, k} and {i, k}. Furthermore, EPR forces ( ◭
{i,j,k}
)
to lie in the intersection of regions determined by ( ◭
{i,j}
), ( ◭
{j,k}
) and ( ◭
{i,k}
), so that ( ◭
{i,j,k}
)
will often come closer to a complete ordering than any of the three pairwise orderings.
In general, EPR forces larger coalitions to have more complete orderings (Baucells and
Shapley, 2006, Prop.3). In particular, if there exists a spanning tree in I such that all
links in this tree are two-person coalitions with complete preferences (i.e. Aij = Aij),
then EPR forces (◭
I
) (the preference order of the grand coalition I) to be a complete,
vNM preference relation on P(X ), generated by a weighted average of the utility functions
of all i ∈ I (Baucells and Shapley, 2008, Thm.4); this can be seen as a generalization
of Harsanyi’s (1955) Social Aggregation Theorem. Baucells and Shapley (2006, Thm.6)
obtain a similar result when I can be covered by system of overlapping subcoalitions, each
having a complete vNM preference. Baucells and Sarin (2003) have applied this theory to
multicriteria decision-making. ▽
Recall that Proposition 3.4(b) says the Suppes-Sen sprow (E
s
) is the ‘minimal’ ()-
sprow, which is extended by every other sprow. Similarly, (E
u
) is the ‘minimal’ ()-sprowl.
Theorem 5.5 Let () be a wipol on P. Every ()-sprowl on P⊗I extends and refines the
approximate utilitarian ()-sprowl (E
u
).
Let X ⊂ P(ΨI×ΦI) be some set of feasible world-lotteries (each corresponding to some
‘policy’), and suppose the social planner wishes to find the (E)-optimal world-lottery in X
with respect to some sprowl (E). Lemma 1.1(g) and Theorem 5.5 imply that
wkDom
(
X ,E
u
)
⊆ wkDom (X ,E) ; strUnd (X ,E) ⊆ strUnd
(
X ,E
u
)
;
and strDom
(
X ,E
u
)
⊆ strDom (X ,E) ⊆ wkUnd (X ,E) ⊆ wkUnd
(
X ,E
u
)
.
Thus, the set of ‘(E)-optimal’ policies will be closely tied to the set of ‘(E
u
)-optimal’ policies,
according to any of the four notions of ‘optimality’ defined in eqn.(1) of §1. In particular,
any bargaining solution proposed by (E) must be a subset of the approximate utilitarian
bargaining solution described in Example 5.3 and portrayed in Figure 3(c). Furthermore,
if X is small enough that (E
u
) is a complete ordering when restricted to X , then Lemma
1.1(c) says that (E) must be identical with (E
u
) on X .
5.2 Hedometry and welfarism
Let P ⊆ P(Ψ×Φ) be a convex subset, and let () be a wipol on P. A lottery hedometer is
a measurable function h : Ψ× Φ−→R such that, for all ρ1, ρ2 ∈ P,(
ρ1  ρ2
)
=⇒
(
h∗(ρ1) ≤ h
∗(ρ2)
)
,
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where h∗ is defined as in eqn.(12). (Thus, for any ψ ∈ Ψ, the function h(ψ, •) : Φ−→R
is a vNM cardinal utility function representing the preference order (
ψ
).) Let HED
lot
() be
the set of lottery hedometers for (). We say that () is hedometric if for any ρ, ρ′ ∈ P,
we have (
ρ  ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(
h∗(ρ) ≤ h∗(ρ′) for all h ∈ HED
lot
()
)
. (23)
Let (◭
u
) be the classic utilitarian SWO on RI . In the terminology of §4.2, (E
u
) is then the
‘(,◭
u
)-welfarist’ sprowl:
Proposition 5.6 Let () be a hedometric wipol on P and let (E
u
) be the approximate
utilitarian ()-sprowl. For any ρ,ρ′ ∈ P⊗I, we have(
ρE
u
ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(∑
i∈I
h∗(ρi) ≤
∑
i∈I
h∗(ρ′i), for all h ∈ HED
lot
()
)
.
When is a wipol hedometric? This is actually a special case of a broader question.
Let X be any measurable space, and let P be a convex set of probability measures on X
with some topology. A vNM preorder is a preorder on P satisfying axiom (Lin) and also
satisfying:
(Cont) For all ρ, ρ′ ∈ P, and sequences {ρn}
∞
n=1 and {ρ
′
n}
∞
n=1, if ρn−−−−n→∞→ρ and ρ
′
n−−−−n→∞→ρ
′,
and ρn  ρ
′
n for all n ∈ N, then ρ  ρ
′.
We say that () has an expected multiutility representation if there exists a collection U of
measurable functions on X such that, for any ρ, ρ′ ∈ P, we have(
ρ  ρ′
)
⇐⇒
(
u∗(ρ) ≤ u∗(ρ′) for all u ∈ U
)
.
Clearly, a wipol is hedometric iff it admits an expected multiutility representation.
Example 5.7: (a) If |X | = N is finite, then P is the simplex in RN , which we endow
with the obvious Euclidean topology. Then any vNM preorder on P has an expected
multiutility representation (Shapley and Baucells, 1998, 1998; Theorem 1.8, p.12).
(b) Let X be a compact metric space, and let P be the space of all Borel probability
measures on X , endowed with the weak* topology induced by the set C(X ) of all continuous
real-valued functions on X . Then any vNM preorder on P has an expected multiutility
representation (Dubra et al., 2004).
(c) Let X be a sigma-compact metric space, and let Pc be the space of compactly supported
Borel probability measures with the weak* topology induced by C(X ). Then any vNM
preorder on Pc has an expected multiutility representation (Evren, 2008, Thm.2). Also,
if P is the space of all Borel probability measures on X , and () is a vNM preorder on
P such that the set of point-masses in P has a ()-maximal element and a ()-minimal
element, then () has an expected multiutility representation (Evren, 2008, Thm.3).
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(d) However, let X = R, and let P be the space of Borel probability measures on R,
endowed with the weak* topology from the space Cb(R) of bounded continuous real-valued
functions. Then Evren (2008, Prop.1) has shown some vNM orders on P do not admit
expected multiutility representations. ♦
Thus, if Ψ × Φ is a finite set or a compact metric space, then a wipol on Ψ × Φ is
hedometric whenever it satisfies axiom (Cont) with respect to a natural topology on P.
However, if Ψ× Φ is a non-compact space, the situation is more complicated. If Ψ× Φ is
just an abstract measurable space, the question is open.
6 Stochastic utilitarianism
We now turn to a very different model of approximate interpersonal utility comparisons.
Suppose there exists a complete wipo () on Ψ × Φ which, in principle, would allow us
to make precise interpersonal comparisons of well-being. The wipo () is described by a
‘true hedometer’ h : Ψ×Φ−→R such that, for all (ψ, φ), (ψ′, φ′) ∈ Ψ×Φ, (ψ, φ)  (ψ′, φ′)
if and only if h(ψ, φ) ≤ h(ψ′, φ′). However, the exact structure of () is unknown. We
model this by representing h as a random variable. That is, we introduce a probability
space Ω, and represent h by a measurable function H : Ψ× Φ× Ω−→R.
This model has at at least three interpretations. In the first interpretation, we suppose
that, for all ψ ∈ Ψ, we have perfect knowledge of the individual preference ordering (
ψ
),
which can be described by a cardinal utility function uψ : Φ−→R. However, the different
utility functions {uψ}ψ∈Ψ are expressed on different ‘scales’, and the correct interpersonal
calibration is unknown to us. For all ψ ∈ Ψ, there are (unknown) constants aψ > 0 and
bψ ∈ R, such that that, for all φ ∈ Φ, h(ψ, φ) = aψ uψ(φ) + bψ. We don’t know the vectors
a := (aψ)ψ∈Ψ ∈ R
Ψ
+ and b := (bψ) ∈ R
Ψ so we model them as a random variables. Thus, in
this model, Ω := RΨ+×R
Ψ (with some probability measure), and H : Ψ×Φ×RΨ+×R
Ψ−→R
is defined by H(ψ, φ, a,b) := aψ ◦ uψ(φ) + bψ, for all (ψ, φ, a,b) ∈ Ψ× Φ× R
Ψ
+ × R
Ψ.
In the second interpretation, we suppose we know the true hedometer h, so in principle
we could make precise interpersonal comparisons. However, we have incomplete knowledge
of the psychological ‘type’ of each person (as in a Bayesian game). We suppose there is
some space Ξ of ‘true’ psychological types (which are hidden), and interpret Ψ as a space of
‘publicly visible’ personality types. The true hedometer is a known function h : Ξ×Φ−→R,
such that h(ξ, •) : Φ−→R is the (correctly calibrated) cardinal utility function of a person
whose true type is ξ. If a person’s visible personality is ψ ∈ Ψ, then her true psychological
type ξ(ψ) ∈ Ξ is unknown to us, and thus modelled as a random variable. Formally, we
introduce a probability space Ω and define a measurable function ξ : Ψ×Ω−→Ξ. We then
define H : Ψ× Φ× Ω−→R by H(ψ, φ, ω) := h[ξ(ψ, ω), φ].
The third interpretation combines both forms of ambiguity. That is, we assume that
we have incomplete knowledge of the psychological types of the individuals, and we also
have incomplete knowledge of the correct calibration we need to compare utility functions
between individuals.
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6.1 A stochastic social aggregation theorem
Let X be a set of social alternatives, and let P(X ) be the set of lotteries over these
alternatives. Let I be a set of individuals. Harsanyi (1955, 1976) presented the following
result as a strong argument for utilitarianism.
Social Aggregation Theorem. For each i ∈ I, let (
i
) be a vNM preference relation
on P(X ), represented by vNM utility function ui : X−→R. Let (E) be the social planner’s
vNM preference relation over P(X ), and suppose (E) satisfies:
(Par) For any ρ, ρ′ ∈ P(X ), if ρ
i
ρ′ for all i ∈ I, then ρEρ′.
Then there exist nonnegative constants {ci}i∈I ⊂ R+ such that (E) is represented by the
vNM utility function U : X−→R defined by U(x) :=
∑
i∈I
ciui(x) for all x ∈ X . 2
Unfortunately, because of its ‘single-profile’ framework, the SAT is not an argument for
utilitarianism. It does not prescribe a particular weighted utilitarian social choice function
which the social planner must employ, independent of the profile of individual vNM pref-
erences. Instead, the SAT says that, given a profile {
i
}i∈I of individual vNM preferences,
and given a collective vNM preference (E) (generated through whatever means), if (E) sat-
isfies (Par) for the profile {
i
}i∈I , then (E) can always be ‘rationalized’ as utilitarianism ex
post facto, by a suitable choice of constants {ci}i∈I . The constants {ci}i∈I might depend
on the particular profile {
i
}i∈I . A proper characterization of utilitarianism must specify
some constants {ci}i∈I independent of the particular profile {
i
}i∈I , and must apply to all
conceivable profiles. See Weymark (1991) or Mongin (1994) for further discussion.
Let P(ΨI×ΦI) be the space of probability distributions over ΨI × ΦI . For any ρ ∈
P(ΨI×ΦI) and i ∈ I, let ρi ∈ P(Ψ×Φ) be the projection of ρ onto the ith coordinate, as
defined by eqn.(14) in §5.1. Fix ω ∈ Ω, and let H∗(ρi, ω) be the ρi-expected value of H,
given ω. That is:
H∗(ρi, ω) :=
∫
Ψ×Φ
H(ψ, φ, ω) dρi(ψ, φ).
Given ω, assume that individual i has a preference relation (
ω,i
) over P(ΨI×ΦI) defined by
(ρ
ω,i
ρ′) ⇐⇒ (H∗(ρi, ω) ≤ H
∗(ρ′i, ω)). This is a vNM preference relation on P(Ψ
I×ΦI),
with vNM utility function hωi : Ψ
I × ΦI−→R defined by hωi (ψ,φ) := H(ψi, φi, ω).
As in §5.1, the social planner must formulate preference relation (E) over P(ΨI×ΦI).
If (E) satisfies the vNM axioms, then it can be represented by a vNM utility function
U : ΨI × ΦI−→R. The problem is that the correct choice of U may depend on the true
value of ω, which is unknown to the planner. For any measurable subset S ⊆ Ω, if the
planner ‘observes’ S (i.e. if she acquires enough information to know that ω ∈ S), then
we suppose she formulates a vNM preference relation (E
S
) on P(ΨI×ΦI), described by
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a vNM utility function US : Ψ
I × ΦI−→R. Let S be the sigma-algebra on Ω and let
π : S−→[0, 1] be the probability measure. We suppose that the family {US}S∈S of utility
functions satisfies the following ‘Bayesian consistency’ condition:
(Bayes) For any (ψ,φ) ∈ ΨI ×ΦI and any countable collection {Sn}
∞
n=1 ⊂ S of disjoint
measurable sets, if S =
∞⊔
n=1
Sn, then US(ψ,φ) =
1
π(S)
∞∑
n=1
π(Sn)USn(ψ,φ).
Intuitively, this says that the family {US}S∈S behaves as if US(ψ,φ) is the expected value
of the unknown ‘true’ social utility of the world (ψ,φ), conditioned on the observation S.
Indeed, we have the following:
Lemma 6.1 Suppose the family {US}S∈S satisfies (Bayes). Then there exists a measurable
function U : ΨI × ΦI × Ω−→R such that, for any S ∈ S and (ψ,φ) ∈ ΨI × ΦI,
US(ψ,φ) =
1
π(S)
∫
S
Uω(ψ,φ) dπ[ω]. (24)
Intuitively, Uω : Ψ × Φ−→R is the vNM utility function which the planner would
employ if she knew that the true value was ω. Let (E
ω
) be the vNM preference relation on
P(ΨI×ΦI) represented by Uω. For all ω ∈ Ω, we assume (E
ω
) satisfies the following axioms:
(Par) For all ρ,ρ′ ∈ P(ΨI×ΦI), if ρ
ω,i
ρ′ for all i ∈ I, then ρE
ω
ρ′.
(Anon) If σ : I−→I is any permutation, then for all ρ ∈ P(ΨI×ΦI), ρ
△
≈
ω
σ(ρ) [where
σ(ρ) is defined by eqn.(15)].
(Nonindiff) The ordering (E
ω
) is not totally indifferent over P(ΨI×ΦI).
(Welf) There exists a function F : RI−→R such that, for any ω ∈ Ω and (ψ,φ) ∈
ΨI × ΦI , if ri := H(ψi, φi, ω) for all i ∈ I, then Uω(ψ,φ) = F (r).
The meanings of axioms (Par), (Anon), and (Nonindiff) are clear. Axiom (Welf) says that
the function U is welfarist: Uω(ψ,φ) is entirely determined by the values of H(ψi, φi, ω)
(for all i ∈ I), independent of ω (see footnote #5 in §4). Loosely speaking, this ensures
that U cannot assign more ‘weight’ to some values of ω than others.
For any S ∈ S, define hS : Ψ× Φ−→R by
hS(ψ, φ) :=
1
π(S)
∫
S
H(ψ, φ, ω) dπ[ω], for all (ψ, φ) ∈ Ψ× Φ. (25)
In words: hS(ψ, φ) is the expected value of the random hedometer H for the personal
psychophysical state (ψ, φ), conditional on observing the event S. We now have:
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Theorem 6.2 Let {(E
S
)}S∈S be a collection of vNM preference relations on P(Ψ
I×ΦI)
satisfying axioms (Bayes), (Par), (Anon), (Nonindiff), and (Welf). Then for any S ∈
S, the relation (E
S
) seeks to maximize the expected value of the utilitarian social welfare
function US : Ψ
I × ΦI−→R defined by
US(ψ,φ) :=
∑
i∈I
hS(ψi, φi), for all (ψ,φ) ∈ Ψ
I × ΦI. (26)
Note that this model entirely obviates the ‘single-profile’ criticism of Harsanyi’s original
SAT. By definition, Ψ × Ω encodes the space of all possible human psychologies which
could ever exist; hence the hedometer H encodes all possible vNM preference relations
which could ever manifest in any profile. Thus, Theorem 6.2 does not presuppose any
particular profile; it prescribes US as the social welfare function which the social planner
must employ when she observes S, independent of the profile of individual vNM preferences
which actually obtains.
Also, for practical purposes, this model does not require the social planner to have
precise information about people’s true preferences. The hidden variable ω could contain
a lot of information; indeed, the model is even applicable when Ψ is trivial, so that all
information about people’s true preferences is hidden from the social planner. However, the
model does require the social planner to have a correct model of the probability distribution
of preferences, even if she doesn’t know which preferences actually obtain (i.e. the planner
must know the true hedometer H : Ψ×Φ×Ω−→R, even if she doesn’t know the true value
of ω). Also, in keeping with the rest of this paper, the model assumes that interpersonal
comparisons of utility are possible in principle, even if they are ambiguous in practice.
6.2 On liberty
Welfarist social choice theory has been criticized for not recognizing the value of personal
liberty.7 Suppose X is a feasible set, and individual i has utility function ui : X−→R.
Let x∗ be the ui-maximal element of X . Intuitively, we feel that a social policy which
allows i to choose x∗ herself is more desirable than a social policy which forces x∗ upon
her —even though both policies yield the same utility for i. Formally, we can imagine a
policy which allows i to choose any element from some subset F ⊆ X ; the larger F is, the
more ‘freedom’ it offers i, and hence, the more desirable the policy.
However, this account is puzzling, because by definition, elements of the set X are
supposed to encode all information relevant to i’s happiness or well-being, as measured
by ui. Furthermore, any ‘freedom’ offered by F is clearly a function of the ‘quality’ of
the elements of F as well as their quantity. For example, if F ′ is obtained by adding an
extremely undesirable option (e.g. ‘execution at dawn’) to F , then we would not feel that
F ′ offers i ‘more freedom’ than F . This is because when i ‘freely chooses’ an element
from F , we suppose what she really does is solve an optimization problem; adding options
which are obviously grossly suboptimal does not enhance her optimization opportunities.
7See Dowding and van Hees (2009) for a summary of this debate.
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However, if this ‘optimization’ view of free choice is correct, then once F contains the
global optimum x∗, it seems futile to add any other options, because any other element of
X is suboptimal, relative to x∗. Hence any measure of ‘freedom’ which accounts for the
‘quality’ of elements in F leads us back to welfarism.
However, this objection assumes that we know the ui-optimal element of X , because
we know ui. In reality, our knowledge of ui is imperfect (cf. the second (‘Bayesian game’)
interpretation of the random hedometer model). Even in a purely welfarist framework,
liberty then acquires instrumental value: by offering i a larger feasible set F to freely
choose from, we increase the probability that F contains her true optimum x∗ (which is
unknown to us); more generally, we increase the expected value of max
x∈F
ui(x).
As before, let Ω be a probability space, and H : Ψ× Φ× Ω−→R represent a ‘random
hedometer’. Fix a society ψ ∈ ΨI . Suppose that social policy does not determine a single
point φ ∈ ΦI ; instead, a social policy determines, for each i ∈ I, some subset Fi ⊆ Φ, leav-
ing i the freedom to choose any element of Fi. Presumably i chooses argmax
φ∈Fi
H(ψi, φi, ω).
Let us refer to the collection (Fi)i∈I as a freedom allocation.
8 Given a choice between two
freedom allocations F := (Fi)i∈I and F
′ := (F ′i)i∈I , a utilitarian social planner will choose
F over F′ if it offers a higher expected utility sum, conditional on individual optimization;
that is, if ∫
Ω
∑
i∈I
max
φi∈Fi
H(ψi, φi, ω) dω >
∫
Ω
∑
i∈I
max
φ′i∈F
′
i
H(ψi, φ
′
i, ω) dω.
Thus, a stochastic utilitarian may deem it socially optimal to grant considerable liberty to
citizens.
7 Models of wipos
This section describes three models of how a weak interpersonal preference ordering might
be constructed. These are not practical operationalizations, but are aimed instead at prov-
ing a philosophical point: under plausible assumptions, weak interpersonal comparisons
can be well-defined in principle.
Most of the following constructions are obtained by ‘stitching together’ a collection of
preorders. Let X be a set and let {
λ
}λ∈Λ be a collection of preorders on X (where Λ is
some indexing set). The join of {
λ
}λ∈Λ is the transitive closure (
J
) of the union of the
relations {
λ
}λ∈Λ. That is, x
J
x′ if there exists a sequence x = x0
λ1
x1
λ2
· · · 
λN
xN = x
′,
where λn ∈ Λ for all n ∈ [1...N ]. It is easy to see that (
J
) is itself a preorder (it is
transitive and reflexive), which extends (
λ0
) for every λ0 ∈ Λ. However, the asymmetric
8Presumably the social planner is constrained in the sort of freedom allocations she can offer, but we
will refrain from formally modelling these constraints. Also, we are unrealistically assuming that each
i ∈ I can choose a point in Fi independent of the choices made by other j ∈ I. In reality, the agents
might interact (e.g. trade) and their choices will be interdependent, resulting in an I-player game.
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factor (≺
J
) does not necessarily extend the asymmetric factor (≺
λ0
), because elements which
are strictly ordered by (
λ0
) may be rendered equivalent through some chain of relations in
the union of {
λ
}λ∈Λ. Many of the technical complications which follow arise in response
to this problem.
7.1 Nonexample: Wipos based on multiple desiderata
We begin with a nonexample, which shows that one obvious strategy for defining a wipo
fails. Let q : Φ−→RK be some function, such that, for all k ∈ [1...K], the component
qk : Φ−→R is some quantitative measure of ‘quality of life’. For example, some of the
coordinates of q might be the consumption levels of various physical goods; others might
be various measures of physical health, or welfare indicators such as education level or
opportunities for participation in the social, cultural and political life of the community;
others might try to measure more intangible desiderata such as autonomy, security, dignity,
liberty, or self-actualization. Some coordinates of q could measure Rawls’ (1971) ‘primary
goods’ or Sen’s (1985, 1988) ‘functionings and capabilities’. Define preorder (
q
) on Ψ×Φ
by (
(ψ, φ)
q
(ψ′, φ′)
)
⇐⇒
(
qk(φ) ≤ qk(φ
′) for every k ∈ [1...K]
)
.
Suppose the collection {q1, . . . , qK} is comprehensive enough that, for any ψ ∈ Ψ, and
any φ, φ′ ∈ Φ, if (ψ, φ)
q
(ψ, φ′), then φ
ψ
φ′ (but not conversely). Thus, if we define (
∗
)
to be the join of (
q
) and {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ, then we would expect (
∗
) to be a wipo. However,
Pattanaik and Xu (2007; §3, Proposition 1) have shown that this is false, as long as different
individuals have even slightly different preferences over Φ (a principle they call ‘minimal
relativism’). The problem is that the definition of (
q
) clearly forces (ψ, φ)≈
q
(ψ′, φ′) (and
hence, (ψ, φ)≈
∗
(ψ′, φ′)), whenever q(φ) = q(φ′). This is in fact a very strong assumption
of interpersonal preference comparison, and leaves individuals with essentially no room to
differ in their preference orderings.
To illustrate the problem, suppose K = 2, let φ1, φ2 ∈ Φ, and suppose q(φ1) = (1, 2),
while q(φ2) = (2, 1); thus, neither φ1≺
q
φ2 nor φ2≺
q
φ1. Let ψ, ψ
′ ∈ Ψ, and suppose φ1≺
ψ
φ2
while φ2≺
ψ′
φ1. Suppose we can find some φ
′
1 very ‘close’ to φ1 such that q(φ
′
1) is close
to (1, 2) but dominates it; say q(φ′1) = (1.01, 2.01). Thus, φ1≺
q
φ′1, but assuming ψ has
continuous preferences, we have φ′1≺ψ φ2. Next, find some φ
′
2 very ‘close’ to φ2, such that
q(φ′2) is close to (2, 1) but dominates it; say q(φ
′
2) = (2.01, 1.01). Thus, φ2≺
q
φ′2, but
assuming ψ′ has continuous preferences, we have φ′2≺ψ′ φ1. Putting it all together, we get
φ1≺
q
φ′1≺ψ φ2≺q φ
′
2
≺
ψ′
φ1.
Thus, if (
∗
) is the join of (
q
), (
ψ
) and (
ψ′
), then we get φ1
∗
φ′1∗ φ2∗ φ
′
2∗ φ1, so that φ1≈∗ φ2,
contradicting the fact that φ1≺
ψ
φ2.
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7.2 Wipos based on envy and pity
Suppose that each individual can attempt interpersonal comparisons between herself and
other people, but not between two other people. Formally, for each ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Ψ, let ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) be
a wipo on {ψ1, ψ2}×Φ which agrees with (
ψ1
) on {ψ1}×Φ and agrees with (
ψ2
) on {ψ2}×Φ.
The order ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) is a ψ1-type person’s comparison between herself and a ψ2-type person; if
(ψ1, φ1) ≺
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2), then we might say that ψ1 ‘envies’ ψ2; whereas if (ψ1, φ1) ≻
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2),
then we might say that ψ1 ‘pities’ ψ2. ‘Self-knowledge’ requires ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) to agree with (
ψ1
),
while ‘nonpaternalism’ requires ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) to agree with (
ψ2
).
These interpersonal comparisons might not be correct; for example, ψ1 might envy
ψ2, while ψ2 simultaneously envies ψ1 (i.e. we might have (ψ1, φ1) ≺
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2) while
(ψ2, φ2) ≺
ψ2,ψ1
(ψ1, φ1)). However, if both ψ1 and ψ2 agree that ψ1 is happier, we might
take this to mean that ψ1 objectively is happier than ψ2. In other words, we could define
a relation (
&
) on Ψ× Φ by(
(ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ2, φ2)
)
⇐⇒
(
(ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2) and (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ2,ψ1
(ψ2, φ2)
)
. (27)
Unfortunately, the relation (
&
) defined by (27) might not be a wipo, because it might
violate condition (W1): there may exist ψ ∈ Ψ and φ, φ′ ∈ Φ such that φ′≻
ψ
φ, but
(ψ, φ′)
&
(ψ, φ).
Example 7.1: Ψ = {0, 1, 2}, let Φ = Z, and suppose (
ψ
) is the standard ordering on Z for
all ψ ∈ Ψ. Suppose that each ψ ∈ Ψ believes that (ψ−1, φ+1) ≺
ψ,ψ−1
(ψ, φ) ≺
ψ,ψ+1
(ψ+1, φ−1),
for all φ ∈ Z (here, we perform addition in Ψ mod 3, so that 2+ 1 ≡ 0 mod 3, etc.). Thus,
for all ψ ∈ Ψ, if ψ′ = ψ+1 mod 3, then the orderings ( 
ψ,ψ′
) and ( 
ψ′,ψ
) agree on {ψ, ψ′}×Φ,
so definition (27) is in force. But (0, 9)
&
(1, 8)
&
(2, 7)
&
(0, 6). Taking the transitive closure,
we get (0, 9)
&
(0, 6), which contradicts the fact that 9≻
0
6. ♦
The system of envy/pity relations { 
ψ1,ψ2
}ψ1,ψ2∈Ψ is consistent if the following holds: for
any (ψ1, φ1), (ψ2, φ2) ∈ Ψ × Φ with (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2) and (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ2,ψ1
(ψ2, φ2), and any
(ψ′, φ′) ∈ Ψ× Φ:
• if (ψ′, φ′) 
ψ′,ψ1
(ψ1, φ1), then also (ψ
′, φ′) 
ψ′,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2);
• if (ψ′, φ′) 
ψ′,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2), then also (ψ
′, φ′) 
ψ′,ψ1
(ψ1, φ1).
This weak transitivity condition requires ψ′ to respect any {ψ1, ψ2}-interpersonal compar-
isons on which both ψ1 and ψ2 agree. For example, if both ψ1 and ψ2 think that ψ2 is
happier than ψ1, and ψ
′ envies ψ1 then she must also envy ψ2. (However, if ψ1 and ψ2
disagree about their relative happiness levels, then ψ′ is not obliged to be consistent with
either of them).
36
Proposition 7.2 Suppose that, for any ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Ψ, the relation ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) is a wipo on
{ψ1, ψ2} × Φ. Also suppose the system { 
ψ1,ψ2
}ψ1,ψ2∈Ψ is consistent. Then (& ) is a wipo.
7.3 Wipos from local expertise
Ortun˜o-Ortin and Roemer (1991) propose a model of interpersonal comparisons based on
‘local expertise’. For each ψ ∈ Ψ, let Nψ ⊂ Ψ be a ‘neighbourhood’ of the point ψ, and
assume that a ψ-type individual is capable of constructing a ‘local’ wipo (
ψ
) over Nψ×Φ.
We can justify ψ’s ability to make interpersonal comparisons of well-being over Nψ ×Φ in
at least two ways:
• Each psychology ν ∈ Nψ is so ‘psychologically similar’ to ψ that a ψ-person can
completely empathize with a ν-person, and accurately compare of their levels of
well-being.
• N = P(ψ) ∪ F(ψ), where P(ψ) and F(ψ) are the past and possible future psy-
chologies of type ψ. As argued under the heading Intertemporal Comparisons in
the introduction, ψ must be able to make interpersonal comparisons over P(ψ) and
F(ψ), because she remembers her past and can make choices about her future.
We will require the system {Nψ,
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ to satisfy the following consistency condition:
(RO) If Nψ1 ∩Nψ2 6= ∅, then the local wipos (
ψ1
) and (
ψ2
) agree on (Nψ1 ∩Nψ2)× Φ.
(This condition is quite natural if we suppose that (
ψ1
) and (
ψ2
) are both fragments of some
some underlying ‘objectively true’ interpersonal comparison structure.) We then define a
global relation (
RO
) as the join of {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ.
The relation (
RO
) is not necessarily a wipo, because it might violate condition (W1).
When stitching together the local relations {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ, we may introduce a preference cycle
(ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
(ψ2, φ2)
ψ2
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN)
ψN
(ψ1, φ
′
1)≺ψ1
(ψ1, φ1).
Taking the transitive closure, we get (ψ1, φ1)
RO
(ψ1, φ
′
1), contradicting the fact that φ
′
1≻ψ1
φ′1.
Example 7.3: Suppose Ψ = {0, 1, 2, 3}, and let Nψ := {j−1, j, j+1} for all ψ ∈ Ψ (where
we perform addition mod 4, so that 3 + 1 ≡ 0 mod 4, etc.). Let Φ = Z, and suppose (
ψ
)
is the standard ordering on Z for all ψ ∈ Ψ. Suppose that each ψ ∈ Ψ believes that
(ψ− 1, φ+1)≺
ψ
(ψ, φ)≺
ψ
(ψ+1, φ− 1), for all φ ∈ Z. . Then each pair of local wipos agrees
on their overlap, but (0, 9)
RO
(1, 8)
RO
(2, 7)
RO
(3, 6)
RO
(0, 5). Taking the transitive closure, we
get (0, 9)
RO
(0, 5), which contradicts the fact that 5≺
0
9. ♦
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ψ1
ψ2
ψ3
ψ4
ψ5
ψ6
ψ7
Nψ3
Nψ6
ψ1
ψ2
ψ3 ψ4 ψ5
ψ1
ψ2
ψ4 ψ5
Nψ2 Nψ2
(A) (B)
(C)
Figure 6: (A) A chain. Here, Ψ = Z2, and for all ψ ∈ Ψ, Nψ = {ψ′ ∈ Ψ; |ψ1 − ψ′1| ≤ 1 and
|ψ2 − ψ
′
2
| ≤ 1}. We have shaded Nψ3 and Nψ6 to illustrate. (B) An elementary homotopy, obtained by
deleting the element ψ3 from the chain. (C) A sequence of elementary homotopies yields a homotopy from
the far-left chain to the far-right chain.
To prevent preference cycles, we need additional conditions. Given a neighbourhood
system N := {Nψ}ψ∈Ψ and two points ψ, ψ
′ ∈ Ψ, an N-chain from ψ to ψ′ is a sequence
ψ = ψ0, ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψN = ψ
′ such that, for all n ∈ [1...N ], ψn ∈ Nψn−1 (see Figure 6(A)).
We say that N chain-connects Ψ if any two points in Ψ can be connected with an N-
chain. If ψ := (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψn−1, ψn, ψn+1, · · · , ψN) is an N-chain and ψn+1 ∈ Nψn−1 , then
ψ′ := (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψn−1, ψn+1, · · · , ψN) is also an N-chain; we say that ψ
′ and ψ are related
by elementary homotopy, and write ψ
ǫ˜
ψ′ (see Figure 6(B)). Note that ψ and ψ′ have
the same endpoints. Two N-chains ψ and ψ′ are homotopic if ψ can be converted into ψ′
through a sequence of elementary homotopies —that is, there is a sequence of N-chains
ψ = ψ1 ǫ˜ ψ2 ǫ˜ · · · ǫ˜ ψN = ψ
′ (see Figure 6(C)). It follows that ψ and ψ′ must have the
same endpoints.
The N-chain ψ is closed if ψN = ψ0. We say ψ is trivial if ψ0 = ψ1 = · · · = ψN .
We say ψ is nullhomotopic if ψ is chain-homotopic to a trivial chain. The neighbourhood
system N := {Nψ}ψ∈Ψ is simply connected if it chain-connects Ψ, and any closed chain is
nullhomotopic.
Example 7.4: (a) Suppose Ψ is a simply connected topological space (e.g. Ψ = RN), and
for each ψ ∈ Ψ, let Nψ be a simply connected open neighbourhood of ψ (e.g. a ball). Then
the system N is simply connected.
(b) Suppose Ψ = ZN , and for all ψ ∈ Ψ, let Nψ be the unit box around ψ —that is,
Nψ :=
{
ψ′ ∈ ZN ; |ψ′n − ψn| ≤ 1, ∀n ∈ [1...N ]
}
. Then N is simply connected.
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(c) The system in Example 7.3 is not simply connected. For example, the sequence
(0, 1, 2, 3, 0) is a closed chain, but it is not nullhomotopic. ♦
The local wipo (
ψ
) on Nψ is indifference-connected if, for any φ ∈ Φ and ν ∈ Nψ,
there is some φ′ such that (ψ, φ)≈
ψ
(ν, φ′) (Roemer and Ortun˜o-Ortin call this property
‘continuity’). Indifference-connectedness is a very strong property: in particular it implies
that each wipo (
ψ
) is a complete ordering of Nψ × Φ. The system of local wipos {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ
is consistent if each wipo (
ψ
) can be extended to an indifference-connected wipo (ˆ
ψ
), such
that the system {Nψ, ˆ
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ still has property (RO). Intuitively, this means that the wipo
(
ψ
) represents ψ’s incomplete perception of some underlying, objectively true system of
complete interpersonal comparisons, encoded by {ˆ
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ. It is not necessary for us to have
explicit knowledge of {ˆ
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ —only to know that it exists.
Proposition 7.5 Suppose N is simply connected, and the system {Nψ,
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ satisfies
(RO).
(a) If the system {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ is consistent, then the global relation (
RO
) is a wipo.
(b) Suppose, for all ψ ∈ Ψ, that (
ψ
) is indifference-connected. Then the global rela-
tion (
RO
) is wipo and a complete order on Ψ× Φ.
Ortun˜o-Ortin and Roemer (1991) prove two special cases of Proposition 7.5(b): the
case Ψ = ZN described in Example 7.4(b), and the case when Ψ = RN , where, for each
ψ ∈ RN , the neighbourhood Nψ is arc-connected and has radius at least ǫ around ψ, for
some fixed ǫ > 0. However, Proposition 7.5(b) requires indifference-connectedness, which
may be an unreasonably strong assumption even for ‘local’ interpersonal comparisons.
7.4 Wipos from infinitesimal expertise
One might object that even the ‘local’ wipos posited in §7.3 assume an unrealistic level of
interpersonal comparability. In response to this objection, we now consider a model which
posits only ‘infinitesimal’ interpersonal comparisons. This will require some elementary
differential geometry; see Warner (1983) for background.
Suppose Ψ and Φ are differentiable manifolds, and let Ψ×Φ have the product manifold
structure. For any ψ ∈ Ψ, let Tψ Ψ be the tangent space of Ψ at ψ; for any φ ∈ Φ,
we similarly define the tangent spaces TφΦ and T(ψ,φ) (Ψ × Φ) ∼= Tψ Ψ × TφΦ. If γ :
(−ǫ, ǫ)−→Φ is any smooth curve with γ(0) = φ, then let γ′(0) ∈ TφΦ be the velocity vector
of γ at 0; if ~0ψ ∈ Tψ Ψ is the zero vector, then (~0ψ, γ
′(0)) is an element of T(ψ,φ) (Ψ× Φ).
Let ~0φ be the zero vector in TφΦ, and let ~0(ψ,φ) := (~0ψ,~0φ) ∈ T(ψ,φ) (Ψ× Φ).
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For every (ψ, φ) ∈ Ψ× Φ, let ( ~
(ψ,φ)
) be a preorder on T(ψ,φ) (Ψ× Φ) with the following
property: If γ : (−ǫ, ǫ)−→Φ is any smooth curve with γ(0) = φ, such that φ
ψ
γ(t) for all
t > 0, then ~0(ψ,φ)
~
(ψ,φ)
(~0ψ, γ
′(0)). Intuitively, if ~v ∈ T(ψ,φ) (Ψ × Φ) and ~v
~
(ψ,φ)
~0(ψ,φ), then
this means that infinitesimal movement through the manifold Ψ × Φ in the ~v direction
is regarded as a net improvement, even if it involves a change of psychological state as
well as physical state. In other words, we are allowed to make ‘infinitesimal’ interpersonal
comparisons of well-being: comparisons between individuals whose psychologies are only
infinitesimally different. This yields a wipo (
;
) on Ψ× Φ, defined as follows:
(
(ψ0, φ0)
;
(ψ1, φ1)
)
⇐⇒
(
∃ smooth path γ : [0, 1]−→Ψ× Φ with γ(0) = (ψ0, φ0),
γ(1) = (ψ1, φ1), and γ
′(t) ~
γ(t)
~0γ(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1]
)
.
In other words, it is possible to move from (ψ0, φ0) to (ψ1, φ1) along a path which, at every
instant, is regarded as an ‘infinitesimal improvement’. We refer to γ as an improvement
path.
The relation (
;
) is not necessarily acyclic, unless further conditions are imposed on the
system of order relations X = { ~
(ψ,φ)
}(ψ,φ)∈Ψ×Φ. The system X is smooth if there exists an
open cover {Oj}j∈J of Ψ (for some indexing set J ), and for each j ∈ J , a smooth function
uj : Oj × Φ−→R such that:
(Sm1) For each j ∈ J , each ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Oj, we have uj ({ψ1} × Φ) = uj ({ψ2} × Φ).
(Sm2) For each j ∈ J , each (ψ, φ) ∈ Oj ×Φ, and each ~v ∈ T(ψ,φ) (Ψ×Φ), if ~v
~
(ψ,φ)
~0(ψ,φ),
then ∇ui(ψ, φ)[~v] ≥ 0.
(Sm3) For any j, k ∈ J , if Oj ∩Ok 6= ∅, then uj and uk are ‘ordinally equivalent’ on their
domain overlap: for all ψ, ψ′ ∈ Oj∩Ok and all φ, φ
′ ∈ Φ,, we have ui(ψ, φ) ≤ ui(ψ
′, φ′)
if and only if uj(ψ, φ) ≤ uj(ψ
′, φ′).
Proposition 7.6 If Ψ is simply connected and X is smooth, then (
;
) is a wipo.
Conclusion
Under quite mild and plausible assumptions about interpersonal comparability, it is possi-
ble to define a wipo —an incomplete preorder on a space of psychophysical states —which
makes possible substantive interpersonal comparisons of well-being (§2 and §7). This al-
lows us to construct a sprow: a preorder on the space of social alternatives which, while
still incomplete, is far more complete than the Pareto preorder (§3). If the wipo can be
represented by a set of ordinal utility functions; we can then use a social welfare order
on RI to obtain a ‘welfarist’ sprow (§4). The ‘approximate egalitarian’ sprow occupies a
special place amongst these welfarist sprows (Theorem 4.6).
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When we extend this model to choice under uncertainty, we find that every reason-
able social order extends and refines the ‘approximate utilitarian’ ordering (Theorem 5.5),
which, under mild topological hypotheses, also admits a ‘welfarist’ representation (Propo-
sition 5.6). A slightly different approach to stochastic interpersonal comparisons leads to
a profile-independent version of Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem (Theorem 6.2).
In summary: approximate interpersonal comparisons are intuitively plausible, and ad-
mit precise mathematical representations, from which a nontrivial theory of distributive
justice can be built. However, many questions remain unanswered. Is there a more direct
connection between the wipos of §2 and the wipols of §5? Are the converses of Theorem
4.6(b,c) true? Also, aside from the Suppes-Sen, approximate egalitarian, and approximate
utilitarian preorders, what other sprow(l)s have natural characterizations in the framework
we have developed? Finally, a practical question: how can we operationalize approximate
interpersonal welfare comparisons, so that these social orderings can be applied in practice?
Appendix: Proofs
Proofs from §1-§3.
Proof of Lemma 1.1. (a) is clear from the definition.
(b) Let x, x′ ∈ X . If x  x′, then x
λ
x′ for all λ; and thus, x
M
x′.
Suppose x ≺ x′. Then x
λ
x′ for all λ; and thus, x
M
x′; we must show that x 6
M
x′. By
contradiction, suppose x
M
x′. Then x
λ
x′ for all λ, which means x  x′, contradicting
the hypothesis that x ≺ x′.
(c) If (
2
) either extends or refines (
1
), then every pair in X which are (
1
)-comparable
are also (
2
)-comparable; hence if (
1
) is complete then (
2
) is also complete. The second
implication in (c) then follows from statement (2).
(d) “=⇒” Suppose x≺
2
x′. Either x
1
x′ or x
1
x′, or both (because (
1
) is complete).
But if x
1
x′, then x
2
x′ (because (
2
) extends (
1
)); this contradicts the fact that x≺
2
x′.
Thus, we must have x
1
x′ and not x
1
x′; hence x≺
1
x′, as desired.
On the other hand, if x≈
2
x′, then x
1
x′ or x
1
x′ (because (
1
) is complete).
“⇐=” Suppose x
1
x′. Either x
2
x′ or x≻
2
x′ (because (
2
) is complete). But if x≻
2
x′,
then x≻
1
x′ (because (
1
) refines (
2
)); this contradicts the fact that x
1
x′. Thus, we
must have x
2
x′, as desired.
(e) “=⇒” Let x 6= x′. If x≺
2
x′, then x
2
x′; hence x
1
x′ (because (
1
) extends (
2
));
hence x≺
1
x′ (because x 6= x′ and (
1
) is antisymmetric).
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“⇐=” Let x 6= x′. If x
2
x′, then x≺
2
x′ (because x 6= x′ and (
2
) is antisymmetric); hence
x≺
1
x′ (because (
1
) refines (
2
)); hence x
1
x′.
(f) If (
1
) either extends or refines (
2
), then (e) says that (
1
) both extends and refines
(
2
); then the second implication in (c) implies that (
1
) is identical with (
2
).
(g)[i] If (
2
) extends (
1
), then ∀ x, x∗ ∈ X , (x∗
1
x) ⇒ (x∗
2
x), while (x∗ 6
2
x) ⇒
(x∗ 6
1
x).
(g)[ii] If (
2
) refines (
1
), then ∀ x, x∗ ∈ X , (x∗≻
1
x) ⇒ (x∗≻
2
x), while (x∗ 6≺
2
x) ⇒
(x∗ 6≺
1
x). 2
Proof of Proposition 3.4. For the proofs of (a) and (b), let (ψ,φ), (ψ′,φ′) ∈ ΨI × ΦI .
(a) (ParE) Suppose (ψi, φi)  (ψ
′
i, φ
′
i) for all i ∈ I. Let σ : I−→I be the identity map.
Then (ψi, φi)  (ψ
′
σ(i), φ
′
σ(i)) all i ∈ I; hence (ψ,φ)Es (ψ
′,φ′).
(AnonE) Suppose (ψ′,φ′) = σ(ψ,φ) for some permutation σ : I−→I. Then (ψi, φi) ≈
(ψ′σ(i), φ
′
σ(i)) all i ∈ I. Thus, (ψ,φ)
△
≈
s
(ψ′,φ′).
(b) Suppose (ψ,φ)E
s
(ψ′,φ′). We must show that (ψ,φ)E(ψ′,φ′). Let σ : I−→I be
a permutation such that (ψi, φi)  (ψ
′
σ(i), φ
′
σ(i)) all i ∈ I. Then (ψ,φ)Eσ(ψ
′,φ′)
△
≈
(ψ′,φ′). (Here “
△
≈ ” is by (AnonE) and “E” is by (ParE), because (ψi, φi)  (ψ
′
σ(i), φ
′
σ(i))
all i ∈ I.) Thus, (ψ,φ)E(ψ′,φ′) by transitivity.
Suppose (E) also satisfies (SPar), and suppose (ψ,φ) ⊳
s
(ψ′,φ′). We must show that
(ψ,φ) ⊳ (ψ
′,φ′). Let σ : I−→I be a permutation such that (ψi, φi)  (ψ
′
σ(i), φ
′
σ(i))
all i ∈ I. We must have (ψi, φi) ≺ (ψ
′
σ(i), φ
′
σ(i)) for some i ∈ I, because if (ψi, φi) ≈
(ψ′σ(i), φ
′
σ(i)) for all i ∈ I, then (ψ,φ)
△
≈
s
(ψ′,φ′), contradicting the assumption that
(ψ,φ) ⊳
s
(ψ′,φ′). Thus (ψ,φ) ⊳ σ(ψ
′,φ′)
△
≈ (ψ′,φ′). (Here “
△
≈ ” is by (AnonE) and
“( ⊳ )” is by (SParE).) Thus, (ψ,φ) ⊳ (ψ
′,φ′) by transitivity.
(c) follows immediately from (ParE). To prove (d), it suffices to observe that, if every
relation (E
λ
) satisfies (ParE) and (AnonE), then their intersection (E) must also. 2
Proof of Claim 3.6*. For any b,p ∈ B, we have b ◭
æ,ψ
p iff either (1) b1 ≤ p1 and b2 ≤ p2,
or (2) b1 ≤ p1 and b1 ≤ p2− δ or (3) b2 ≤ p2 and b2 ≤ p1− δ (with one of the inequalities
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being strict in each case). Case (1) is false if and only if b ∈ P. So, suppose b ∈ P. For
k = 1, 2, let P k := max {pk ; (p1, p2) ∈ P}. Then(
b ∈ wkUnd
(
B, ◭
æ,ψ
))
⇐⇒
(
∀ p ∈ P, Case (2) is false and Case (3) is false
)
⇐⇒
(
∀ p ∈ P, [b1 ≥ p1 or b1 + δ ≥ p2] and [b2 ≥ p2 or b2 + δ ≥ p1]
)
⇐⇒
(
∀ p ∈ P, [(b1 < p1)⇒ (b1 + δ ≥ p2)] and [(b2 < p2)⇒ (b2 + δ ≥ p1)]
)
⇐
(∗)
⇒
(
∀ p ∈ P, [(b2 > p2)⇒ (b1 + δ ≥ p2)] and [(b1 > p1)⇒ (b2 + δ ≥ p1)]
)
⇐⇒
(
∀ p2 ≤ P 2, [(b2 > p2)⇒ (b1 + δ ≥ p2)], while
∀ p1 ≤ P 1, [(b1 > p1)⇒ (b2 + δ ≥ p1)]
)
⇐⇒
(
b1 + δ ≥ b2 and b2 + δ ≥ b1
)
⇐⇒
(
|b1 − b2| ≤ δ
)
.
Here, (∗) is because (b1 < p1)⇔ (b2 > p2) for all distinct b,p ∈ P. 2
Proofs from §4. We will often use the following fact (whose proof is obvious).
Fact 4.8. If h ∈ HED(), and f : R−→R is strictly increasing, then f ◦ h ∈ HED() also.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. “⇐=” (E
h
) satisfies (AnonE) because (◭) satisfies (Anon◭). If
h ∈ HED(), then (E
h
) satisfies (ParE) because (◭) satisfies (Par◭).
“=⇒” (by contradiction) If (◭) is not a SWO, then (◭) must violate axiom (Anon◭);
it follows that (E
h
) violates (AnonE).
Suppose h 6∈ HED(). Then either statement (8) or statement (9) is violated. If (8) is
violated, then there exist (ψ, φ), (ψ′, φ′) ∈ Ψ×Φ such that (ψ, φ)  (ψ′, φ′), but h(ψ, φ) >
h(ψ′, φ′). Let (ψ1,φ1) and (ψ2,φ2) be the ‘clone worlds’ such that (ψ1i , φ
1
i ) = (ψ, φ) for
all i ∈ I, while (ψ2i , φ
2
i ) = (ψ
′, φ′) for all i ∈ I. Then h(ψ1i , φ
1
i ) > h(ψ
2
i , φ
2
i ) for all i ∈ I,
so h(ψ1,φ1)◮h(ψ
2,φ2) by (Par◭); hence (ψ1,φ1) ⊲
h
(ψ2,φ2). But (ψ1i , φ
1
i )  (ψ
2
i , φ
2
i )
for all i ∈ I, so (ParE) requires that (ψ1,φ1)E
h
(ψ2,φ2). Contradiction.
If statement (9) is violated, then there exist (ψ, φ), (ψ′, φ′) ∈ Ψ× Φ such that (ψ, φ) ≺
(ψ′, φ′), but h(ψ, φ) ≥ h(ψ′, φ′). Let (ψ1,φ1) and (ψ2,φ2) be the same ‘clone worlds’ as
the previous paragraph. Then h(ψ1,φ1)◮h(ψ2,φ2) by (Par◭), so (ψ1,φ1)D
h
(ψ2,φ2).
But (ParE) requires that (ψ1,φ1) ⊳
h
(ψ2,φ2). Again we have a contradiction. 2
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Proof of Proposition 4.4. “=⇒” Let f : I−→I be such that (ψ1f(i), φ
1
f(i))  (ψ
2
i , φ
2
i ) for all
i ∈ I. Let h ∈ HED(). Find i∗ ∈ I such that h(ψ2i∗ , φ
2
i∗) = min
i∈I
h(ψ2i , φ
2
i ). If j
∗ = f(i∗),
then (ψ1j∗ , φ
1
j∗)  (ψ
2
i∗ , φ
2
i∗), so statement (8) says h(ψ
1
j∗ , φ
1
j∗) ≤ h(ψ
2
i∗ , φ
2
i∗); hence
min
j∈I
h(ψ1j , φ
1
j) ≤ h(ψ
1
j∗ , φ
1
j∗) ≤ h(ψ
2
i∗ , φ
2
i∗) = min
i∈I
h(ψ2i , φ
2
i ),
as desired. This works for all h ∈ HED(). (Note that this argument works even if ()
is not hedometric.)
“⇐=” (by contrapositive) Suppose (ψ1,φ1) E
æ
/ (ψ2,φ2). Then there is some j ∈ I
such that, for every i ∈ I, (ψ1i , φ
1
i ) 6 (ψ
2
j , φ
2
j). Thus, for every i ∈ I, there exists some
hi ∈ HED() such that hi(ψ
1
i , φ
1
i ) > hi(ψ
2
j , φ
2
j) (because if h(ψ
1
i , φ
1
i ) ≤ h(ψ
2
j , φ
2
j) for all
h ∈ HED(), then we would have (ψ1i , φ
1
i )  (ψ
2
j , φ
2
j), because () is hedometric).
Without loss of generality, suppose for all i ∈ I that hi(ψ
2
j , φ
2
j) = 0 and hi(ψ
1
i , φ
1
i ) =
ǫi > 0. (If not, then Fact 4.8 says we can add a constant to hi to make this so). Let
ǫ∗ := min
i∈I
ǫi; then ǫ∗ > 0 because I is finite. Let f : R−→R be an increasing function
with the following properties:
(a) f(0) = 0
(b) lim
r→−∞
f(r) ≥ −1, so that f(R) ⊆ (−1,∞).
(c) f(ǫ∗) ≥ I, where I := |I|.
For all i ∈ I, let h′i := f ◦hi; then h
′
i ∈ HED() by Fact 4.8. Finally, define h
∗ :=
∑
k∈I h
′
k;
then it is easy to see that h∗ ∈ HED() also. We have:
h∗(ψ2j , φ
2
j) =
∑
k∈I
h′k(ψ
2
j , φ
2
j) =
∑
k∈I
f
[
hk(ψ
2
j , φ
2
j)
]
=
∑
k∈I
f [0]
(a)
∑
k∈I
0 = 0. (28)
However, for all i ∈ I, we also have
h∗(ψ1i , φ
1
i ) =
∑
k∈I
h′k(ψ
1
i , φ
1
i ) = f
[
hi(ψ
1
i , φ
1
i )
]
+
∑
k∈I\{i}
f
[
hk(ψ
1
i , φ
1
i )
]
≥
(b)
f(ǫi) +
∑
k∈I\{i}
(−1) ≥
(∗)
f(ǫ∗) +
∑
k∈I\{i}
(−1)
≥
(c)
I + (I − 1) · (−1) = 1. (29)
Here, (∗) is because f is increasing and ǫi ≥ ǫ∗. Thus,
min
i∈I
h∗(ψ1i , φ
1
i ) ≥
(29)
1 > 0
(28)
h∗(ψ2j , φ
2
j) ≥ min
i∈I
h∗(ψ2i , φ
2
i ).
Thus, it is false that min
i∈I
h(ψ1i , φ
1
i ) ≤ min
i∈I
h(ψ2i , φ
2
i ) for all h ∈ HED(). This establishes
the contrapositive of the desired implication. 2
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Proof of Theorem 4.6 and ancillary results. For any f : R−→R and r ∈ RI ,
define f(r) := r′ ∈ RI , where r′i := f(ri) for all i ∈ I. Recall the axiom of Ordinal Level
Comparability for a SWO:
(OLC) For any increasing f : R−→R and r1, r2 ∈ RI :
(
r1◭ r2
)
⇐⇒
(
f(r1) ◭ f(r2)
)
.
Lemma 4.9 Let (), (◭) and (E) be as in Theorem 4.6. Then(
(E) is minimally decisive
)
⇐⇒
(
(◭) satisfies (OLC)
)
.
Proof. For any r1, r2 ∈ RI , the rank structure of the pair (r1, r2) is the complete order (⋖)
on {1, 2} × I defined as follows: for all n,m ∈ {1, 2} and i, j ∈ I, (n, i)⋖(m, j) if and
only if rni ≤ r
m
j .
Claim 1: Let r1, r2, s1, s2 ∈ RI . If (r1, r2) has the same rank structure as (s1, s2),
then there exists some increasing function f : R−→R with s1 = f(r1) and s2 = f(r2).
Proof. Let R := {r1i }i∈I ∪ {r
2
i }i∈I and S := {s
1
i }i∈I ∪ {s
2
i }i∈I . Define f : R−→S by
f(rki ) := s
k
i . If (r
1, r2) has the same rank structure as (s1, s2), then f is well-defined
and order-preserving. Thus, we can extend f to an increasing function f : R−→R,
with s1 = f(r1) and s2 = f(r2). 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: Let (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈ ΨI × ΦI be fully ()-comparable. If h ∈ HED(),
r1 := h(ψ1,φ1), and r2 := h(ψ2,φ2), then the rank structure of (r1, r2) is the same as
the rank structure of ((ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2)).
Proof. This follows immediately from the formulae (8) and (9) defining ‘hedometer’.
3 Claim 2
“=⇒” (by contrapositive) Suppose (◭) violates (OLC). Then there exists some r1, r2 ∈
RI and increasing g : R−→R such that r1◭r2 but g(r1)◮g(r2).
Claim 3: There exist some fully ()-comparable (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈ ΨI × ΦI and
h ∈ HED() such that h(ψ1, φ1) = r
1 and h(ψ2, φ2) = r
2.
Proof. Axiom (MR) says that we can find some fully ()-comparable (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈
ΨI × ΦI such that the rank structure of ((ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2)) is the same as the rank
structure of (r1, r2). Let h′ ∈ HED() be any hedometer, let s1 := h′(ψ1,φ1), and
s2 := h′(ψ2,φ2). Then Claim 2 says the rank structure of (s1, s2) is the same as
that of of ((ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2)), and thus, the same as that of (r1, r2). Thus, Claim 1
says there is an increasing function f : R−→R, with r1 = f(s1) and r2 = f(s2). Let
h := f ◦ h′; then h ∈ HED() by Fact 4.8, and r1 := h(ψ1,φ1), and r2 := h(ψ2,φ2),
as desired. 3 Claim 3
Now, let h′′ := g ◦ h; then h′′ ∈ HED() by Fact 4.8, h′′(ψ1, φ1) = g(r
1) and h′′(ψ2, φ2) =
g(r2). But r1◭r2, while g(r1)◮g(r2). Checking definition (11), we see that neither
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(ψ1,φ1)E(ψ2,φ2) nor (ψ2,φ2)E(ψ1,φ1). Thus, (ψ1,φ1) is not (E)-comparable to
(ψ2,φ2); hence (E) is not minimally decisive.
“⇐=” Suppose (◭) satisfies (OLC).
Claim 4: Let r1, r2, s1, s2 ∈ RI . If (r1, r2) has the same rank structure as (s1, s2), and
r1◭r2, then s1◭s2.
Proof. Claim 1 says there is an increasing function f : R−→R, with s1 = f(r1) and
s2 = f(r2). Thus, if r1◭r2, then s1◭s2, because (◭) satisfies (OLC). 3 Claim 4
Let (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈ ΨI × ΦI be fully ()-comparable and let h ∈ HED(). Let
r1 := h(ψ1,φ1) and r2 := h(ψ2,φ2). Since (◭) is a complete ordering of RI , we have
either r1◭r2 or r2◭r1. Without loss of generality, assume r1◭r2.
Claim 5: For all h′ ∈ HED(), we have h′(ψ1,φ1)◭h′(ψ2,φ2).
Proof. Let s1 := h′(ψ1,φ1), and s2 := h′(ψ2,φ2). Claim 2 says the rank structure of
(s1, s2) is the same as that of ((ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2)), which is in turn the same as that
of (r1, r2). Thus, if r1◭r2, then Claim 4 implies that s1◭s2. 3 Claim 5
Combining Claim 5 with defining formula (11), we see that (ψ1,φ1)E(ψ2,φ2). Thus,
(ψ1,φ1) is (E)-comparable to (ψ2,φ2). This argument works for any (ψ1,φ1), (ψ2,φ2) ∈
ΨI × ΦI which are fully ()-comparable. Thus, (E) is minimally decisive. 2
Consider the following version of the ‘minimal equity’ property for a SWO (◭).
(MinEq◭) There exist r, r′ ∈ RI and i, j ∈ I such that:
(q1◭) ri < r
′
i ≤ r
′
j < rj;
(q2◭) ri ≤ rk = r
′
k for all k ∈ I \ {i, j}; and
(q3◭) r ◭ r′.
Lemma 4.10 Let (), (◭) and (E) be as in Theorem 4.6. If (E) is satisfies (MinEqE),
then (◭) satisfies (MinEq◭).
Proof. Find (ψ,φ), (ψ′,φ′) ∈ ΨI×ΦI satisfying conditions (q1E)-(q3E) in axiom (MinEqE).
Let h ∈ HED(), let r := h(ψ,φ), and let r′ := h(ψ′,φ′). We claim that r and r′ satisfy
conditions (q1◭)-(q3◭).
(q1◭): We have (ψi, φi) ≺ (ψ
′
i, φ
′
i)  (ψ
′
j, φ
′
j) ≺ (ψj, φj), by (q1
E); thus, the formulae
(8) and (9) (defining ‘hedometer’) imply that ri < r
′
i ≤ r
′
j < rj.
(q2◭): For all k ∈ I \ {i, j}, we have (ψi, φi)  (ψk, φk) ≈ (ψ
′
k, φ
′
k) by (q2
E); thus,
formula (8) implies that ri ≤ rk = r
′
k.
(q3◭): We have (ψ,φ)E(ψ′,φ′) by (q3E), so formula (11) requires that r◭r′. 2
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Lemma 4.11 Let (◭
1
) and (◭
2
) be two SWOs on RI, and suppose (◭
1
) refines (◭
2
). If (◭
1
)
satisfies (MinEq◭), then (◭
2
) also satisfies (MinEq◭).
Proof. Suppose r, r′ ∈ RI satisfy the conditions of (MinEq◭) for (◭
1
). Then r◭
1
r′. If (◭
1
)
refines (◭
2
), then Lemma 1.1(d) says (◭
2
) extends (◭
1
). Thus, r◭
2
r′. Thus r, r′ ∈ RI also
satisfy the conditions of (MinEq◭) for (◭
2
). 2
Lemma 4.12 Let () be a wipo and let (◭
1
) and (◭
2
) be two SWOs on RI. Let (E
k
) be the
(,◭
k
)-welfarist sprow for k = 1, 2. If (◭
2
) extends (◭
1
), then (E
2
) extends (E
1
).
Proof. Let (ψ,φ), (ψ′,φ′) ∈ ΨI × ΦI . Then(
(ψ,φ)E
1
(ψ′,φ′)
)
⇐⇒
(
h(ψ,φ)◭
1
h(ψ′,φ′) for all h ∈ HED()
)
(∗)
=⇒
(
h(ψ,φ)◭
2
h(ψ′,φ′) for all h ∈ HED()
)
⇐⇒
(
(ψ,φ)E
2
(ψ′,φ′)
)
,
where (∗) is because (◭
2
) extends (◭
1
). 2
(Note that the proof of Lemma 4.12 breaks down if we replace ‘extends’ with ‘refines’.)
Proof of Theorem 4.6. (a) Lemma 4.9 says that (E) is minimally decisive if and only
if (◭) satisfies (OLC). However, a well-known result of Hammond (1976) says that (◭)
satisfies (OLC) if and only if (◭) refines the rank-k dictatorship SWO (◭
k
) for some
k ∈ [1...I] (Moulin, 1988, Thm 2.4, page 40).
(b) From (a) we know that (◭) refines some rank-k dictatorship (◭
k
). If (E) satisfies
(MinEqE), then Lemma 4.10 says that (◭) satisfies (MinEq◭). Thus, Lemma 4.11
says that (◭
k
) also satisfies (MinEq◭). But the only rank-k dictatorship which satisfies
(MinEq◭) is the egalitarian SWO (◭
e
). Thus, (◭
k
) is (◭
e
), so (◭) refines (◭
e
). Then
Lemma 1.1(d) says (◭
e
) extends (◭). Then Lemma 4.12 says (E
æ
) extends (E).
(c,d) Suppose (E) either extends or refines (E
æ
); we will show that (E) is minimally
decisive and satisfies (MinEq).
Minimally Decisive. (E
æ
) is minimally decisive by Example 4.5. Thus, if (E) extends or
refines (E
æ
), then (E) is also minimally decisive (because (E) can compare any pair of
worlds which (E
æ
) can compare).
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Minimal Equity. Using axiom (MR), find fully ()-comparable worlds (ψ,φ), (ψ′,φ′) ∈
ΨI × ΦI with individuals i, j ∈ I such that (ψi, φi) ≺ (ψ
′
i, φ
′
i)  (ψ
′
j, φ
′
j) ≺ (ψj, φj)
and also (ψi, φi) ≺ (ψk, φk) ≈ (ψ
′
k, φ
′
k) for all k ∈ I \ {i, j}. Thus, (ψ,φ), (ψ
′,φ′)
satisfy conditions (q1E) and (q2E) in the definition of (MinEqE). Also, (ψ,φ)E
æ
(ψ′,φ′)
(define f : I−→I by f(k) = i for all k ∈ I). However, (ψ,φ) 6D
æ
(ψ′,φ′)(because
(ψi, φi) ≺ (ψ
′
k, φ
′
k) for all k ∈ I). Thus, (ψ
1,φ1) ⊳
æ
(ψ2,φ2). Thus, if (E) either extends
or refines (E
æ
), then (ψ1,φ1)E(ψ2,φ2). Thus, (ψ,φ), (ψ′,φ′) also satisfy condition
(q3E); hence (E) satisfies (MinEqE).
So, if (E) refines (E
æ
), then (E) is minimally decisive and satisfies (MinEq); this proves
(c). On the other hand, if (E) extends (E
æ
), then part (b) implies that (E
æ
) also extends
(E), which means they must be equal. This proves (d). 2
Proofs from §5.
Proof of Claim 5.2*. For any w ∈ W, we have∑
i∈I
wi · h0(ψi, ρ
′
i)−
∑
i∈I
wi · h0(ψi, ρi) =
(
w1r
′
1 + w2r
′
2
)
−
(
w1r1 + w2r2
)
= w1 · (r
′
1 − r1) + w2 · (r
′
2 − r2) = w2 ·
((
w1
w2
)
· (r′1 − r1) + (r
′
2 − r2)
)
.
Thus, statement (21) becomes(
ρE
u,ψ
ρ′
)
⇐⇒
((
w1
w2
)
· (r′1 − r1) + (r
′
2 − r2) ≥ 0, for all w ∈ W
)
⇐⇒
either (A) (r′1 − r1) ≥ 0 and (r′2 − r2) ≥ 0; or(B) (r′1 − r1) ≥ 0 ≥ (r′2 − r2) and A · (r′1 − r1) ≥ (r2 − r′2); or
(C) (r′2 − r2) ≥ 0 ≥ (r
′
1 − r1) and (r
′
2 − r2) ≥ A · (r1 − r
′
1).
 (30)
If S :=
r′2−r2
r′1−r1
, then condition (B) in statement (30) is equivalent to r′1 ≥ r1, r
′
2 ≤ r2 and
S ≥ −A. Meanwhile, condition (C) is equivalent to r′1 ≤ r1, r
′
2 ≥ r2, and S ≤ −A.
Thus, the right side of statement (30) is equivalent to the right side of statement (22).
2
Proof of Theorem 5.5. Let (E) be a ()-sprowl on P⊗I . Let ρ,ρ′ ∈ P⊗I be two
world-lotteries. We must show that (ρE
u
ρ′) =⇒ (ρEρ′), and (ρ ⊳
u
ρ′) =⇒ (ρ ⊳ρ′).
Without loss of generality, suppose I = [1....I], and define the permutation σ : I−→I
by σ(i) := (i+ 1) mod I. Define ρ̂ :=
1
I
I−1∑
n=0
σn(ρ) and ρ̂′ :=
1
I
I−1∑
n=0
σn(ρ′). Then
ρ =
1
I
I−1∑
n=0
ρ
△
≈
1
I
I−1∑
n=0
σn(ρ) = ρ̂. (31)
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Here “
△
≈ ” is by I-fold application of axiom (LinE), because ρ
△
≈ σn(ρ) for all n ∈ N,
by axiom (AnonE). By a similar argument, ρ′
△
≈ ρ̂
′. Meanwhile, for all i ∈ I, we have
ρˆi = ρ and ρˆ
′
i = ρ
′, (32)
where ρ and ρ′ are the per capita average lotteries of ρ and ρ′, as defined in eqn.(16).
Thus, (
ρE
u
ρ′
)
⇐
(∗)
⇒
(
ρ  ρ′
)
⇐
(†)
⇒
(
ρˆi  ρˆ
′
i for all i ∈ I
)
(‡)
=⇒
(
ρ̂Eρ̂′
)
⇐
(⋄)
⇒
(
ρEρ′
)
.
Likewise,
(
ρ ⊳
u
ρ′
)
⇐
(∗)
⇒
(
ρ ≺ ρ′
)
⇐
(†)
⇒
(
ρˆi ≺ ρˆ
′
i for all i ∈ I
)
(‡)
=⇒
(
ρ̂ ⊳ ρ̂′
)
⇐
(⋄)
⇒
(
ρ ⊳ρ′
)
.
Here, (∗) is by defining formula (17), (†) is by eqn.(32), (‡) is by axiom (ParE), and
(⋄) is by eqn.(31) and the transitivity of (E). 2
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Let ρ and ρ′ be the per capita average lotteries of ρ and ρ′, as
defined in eqn.(16). For any measurable h : Ψ× Φ−→R, we have
h∗(ρ) =
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
h∗(ρi) and h
∗(ρ′) =
1
|I|
∑
i∈I
h∗(ρ′i), (33)
because the function h∗ : P−→R is linear. Thus,(
ρE
u
ρ′
)
⇐
(∗)
⇒
(
ρ  ρ′
)
⇐
(†)
⇒
(
h∗(ρ) ≤ h∗(ρ′), for all h ∈ HED
lot
()
)
⇐
(⋄)
⇒
(∑
i∈I
h∗(ρi) ≤
∑
i∈I
h∗(ρ′i), for all h ∈ HED
lot
()
)
,
as desired. Here, (∗) is by defining formula (17); (†) is by formula (23), and (⋄) is by
eqn.(33). 2
Proofs from §6.
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Fix (ψ,φ) ∈ ΨI × ΦI . Define the function µ(ψ,φ) : S−→R
by µ(ψ,φ)[S] := US(ψ,φ) · π[S], for all S ∈ S. Axiom (Bayes) says that µ(ψ,φ) is
countably additive (i.e. µ(ψ,φ)[
⊔∞
n=1 Sn] =
∑∞
n=1 µ(ψ,φ)[Sn]); hence it is a sigma-finite
signed measure (because π is a probability measure and |US(ψ,φ)| <∞ for all S ∈ S).
Clearly, µ(ψ,φ) is absolutely continuous relative to ρ [i.e. (ρ[S] = 0) =⇒ (µ(ψ,φ)[S] = 0)].
Thus, the Radon-Nikodym Theorem (Conway, 1990, Thm.C.7, p.380) says there is a
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S-measurable function f(ψ,φ) : Ω−→R such that µ(ψ,φ)[S] =
∫
S
f(ψ,φ) dρ for all S ∈ S.
Now define U : ΨI × ΦI × Ω−→R by Uω(ψ,φ) := f(ψ,φ)(ω), for all (ψ,φ) ∈ Ψ
I × ΦI
and ω ∈ Ω. Then for any (ψ,φ) ∈ ΨI × ΦI and S ∈ S, we have
US(ψ,φ) =
µ(ψ,φ)[S]
π[S]
=
1
π[S]
∫
S
f(ψ,φ) dρ =
1
π(S)
∫
S
Uω(ψ,φ) dπ[ω],
which yields eqn.(24). 2
Proof of Theorem 6.2. For any ω ∈ Ω, if the vNM preference relation (E
ω
) satisfies (Par),
then Harsanyi’s SAT implies that (E
ω
) can be represented as maximizing the expected
value of a vNM utility function U˜ω : Ψ
I × ΦI−→R of the form:
U˜ω(ψ,φ) :=
∑
i∈I
cωi ·h
ω
i (ψ,φ) =
∑
i∈I
cωi ·H(ψi, φi, ω), for all (ψ,φ) ∈ Ψ
I × ΦI ,
for some nonnegative constants {cωi }i∈I ⊂ R+. Axiom (Nonindiff) says at least one
these constants is nonzero, while (Anon) implies that they must all be equal; hence we
can assume without loss of generality that cωi = 1 for all i ∈ I, so that U˜ω(ψ,φ) =∑
i∈I
H(ψi, φi, ω) for all (ψ,φ) ∈ Ψ
I × ΦI and ω ∈ Ω.
Now, Uω and U˜ω represent the same vNM preference relation (E
ω
), so there exist constants
a(ω) > 0 and b(ω) ∈ R such that Uω = a(ω) U˜ω + b(ω). That is:
Uω(ψ,φ) = b(ω) + a(ω)
∑
i∈I
H(ψi, φi, ω), for all (ψ,φ) ∈ Ψ
I × ΦI and ω ∈ Ω.
Axiom (Welf) then implies that a(ω1) = a(ω2) and b(ω1) = b(ω2) for all ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω.
Thus, there are constants a > 0 and b ∈ R such that
Uω(ψ,φ) = b+ a
∑
i∈I
H(ψi, φi, ω), for all (ψ,φ) ∈ Ψ
I × ΦI and ω ∈ Ω. (34)
Substituting (34) into (24), we get:
US(ψ,φ) =
1
π(S)
∫
S
(
b+ a
∑
i∈I
H(ψi, φi, ω)
)
dπ[ω]
= b+ a
∑
i∈I
1
π(S)
∫
S
H(ψi, φi, ω) dπ[ω] = b + a
∑
i∈I
hS(ψi, φi), (35)
and where hS is defined as in eqn.(25). But clearly the vNM utility function US in
eqn.(35) is equivalent to the vNM utility function US in eqn.(26). 2
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Proofs from §7.
Proof of Proposition 7.2. Clearly, (
&
) is reflexive. We must show that (
&
) is transitive
and satisfies properties (W1) and (W2).
Transitive. Suppose (ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ2, φ2) and (ψ2, φ2)
&
(ψ3, φ3). We must show that
(ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ3, φ3).
We have (ψ2, φ2) 
ψ2,ψ3
(ψ3, φ3), and (ψ2, φ2) 
ψ3,ψ2
(ψ3, φ3), while (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2), so con-
sistency requires that (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1,ψ3
(ψ3, φ3).
Likewise, (ψ2, φ2) 
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ1, φ1), and (ψ2, φ2) 
ψ2,ψ1
(ψ1, φ1), while (ψ3, φ3) 
ψ3,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2), so
consistency requires that (ψ3, φ3) 
ψ3,ψ1
(ψ1, φ1).
Thus, (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1,ψ3
(ψ3, φ3) and (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ3,ψ1
(ψ3, φ3), so (ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ3, φ3), as desired.
(W1) Fix ψ ∈ Ψ and φ, φ′ ∈ Φ, with φ1≻
ψ
φ′1. By hypothesis, (ψ,ψ) is a wipo on
{ψ} × Φ, so it agrees with (
ψ
). Thus, (ψ, φ) ≻
ψ,ψ
(ψ, φ′); hence applying definition (27)
(with ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ) we conclude that (ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ1, φ1).
(W2) Fix ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Ψ and φ1 ∈ Φ. The relation ( 
ψ1,ψ2
) is a wipo, so it satisfies
(W2), so there is some φ′2 ∈ Φ such that (ψ1, φ1) ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ
′
2). Likewise, ( ψ2,ψ1
) satis-
fies (W2), so there is some φ′′2 ∈ Φ such that (ψ1, φ1) ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ
′′
2). Let φ2 be the (ψ2
)-
maximum of {φ′2, φ
′′
2} (well-defined because (ψ2
) is a complete order of Φ). Then we have
(ψ1, φ1) 
ψ1,ψ2
(ψ2, φ2) and (ψ1, φ1) 
ψ2,ψ1
(ψ2, φ2), and hence (ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ2, φ2).
Through an identical construction, we can obtain some φ2 ∈ Φ such that
(ψ1, φ1)
&
(ψ2, φ2). This works for all ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Ψ and φ1 ∈ Φ; thus, (
&
) satisfies (W2).
2
To prove Proposition 7.5 we need some technical preliminaries. A preference chain
is a sequence (ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
(ψ2, φ2)
ψ2
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN). Clearly, the underlying sequence ψ =
(ψ0, ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψN) must be an N-chain; in this case we say that ψ carries a preference
chain between (ψ1, φ1) and (ψN , φN).
Lemma 8.7 Suppose (
ψ
) is indifference-connected for all ψ ∈ Ψ. Suppose ψ carries a
preference chain between (ψ1, φ1) and (ψN , φN). If ψ is homotopic to ψ
′, then ψ′ also
carries a preference chain between (ψ1, φ1) and (ψN , φN).
Proof. It suffices to prove this when ψ
ǫ˜
ψ′ (the general case follows by induction).
First suppose ψ := (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψn−1, ψn, ψn+1, · · · , ψN) carries the preference chain
(ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
· · · 
ψn−2
(ψn−1, φn−1) 
ψn−1
(ψn, φn)
ψn
(ψn+1, φn+1) 
ψn+1
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN). Suppose
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ψn+1 ∈ Nψn−1 andψ
′ := (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψn−1, ψn+1, · · · , ψN). Then (ψn, φn) 
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1),
because (ψn, φn)
ψn
(ψn+1, φn+1) and ψn, ψn+1 ∈ Nψn−1 ∩ Nψn , and (
ψn
) agrees with
( 
ψn−1
) on (Nψn−1 ∩ Nψn) × Φ by (RO). Thus, (ψn−1, φn−1) 
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1), because
(ψn−1, φn−1) 
ψn−1
(ψn, φn) and ( 
ψn−1
) is transitive. Thus, we get a preference chain
(ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
· · · 
ψn−2
(ψn−1, φn−1) 
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1) 
ψn+1
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN) supported on ψ
′, as
desired.
Now suppose ψ := (ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψn−1, ψn+1, · · · , ψN) carries the preference chain
(ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
· · · 
ψn−2
(ψn−1, φn−1) 
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1) 
ψn+1
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN), and suppose ψ :=
(ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψn−1, ψn, ψn+1, · · · , ψN), for some ψn ∈ Nψn−1 such that ψn+1 ∈
Nψn . Since ( 
ψn−1
) is indifference-connected, we can find some φn ∈ Φ such
that (ψn−1, φn−1) ≈
ψn−1
(ψn, φn). Thus, (ψn, φn) 
ψn−1
(ψn+1, φn+1) because ( 
ψn−1
) is tran-
sitive. Thus, (ψn, φn)
ψn
(ψn+1, φn+1) because ψn, ψn+1 ∈ Nn−1 ∩ Nn, and (
ψn
)
agrees with ( 
ψn−1
) on (Nn−1 ∩ Nn) × Φ by (RO). Thus, we get a preference
chain (ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
· · · 
ψn−2
(ψn−1, φn−1) ≈
ψn−1
(ψn, φn)
ψn
(ψn+1, φn+1) 
ψn+1
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN) sup-
ported on ψ′, as desired. 2
Lemma 8.8 Suppose N is a simply connected, and for all ψ ∈ Ψ, suppose the relation (
ψ
)
is indifference-connected. Then the system {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ admits no preference cycles.
Proof. Suppose (ψ0, φ0)
ψ0
(ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
· · · 
ψN−2
(ψN−1, φN−1) 
ψN−1
(ψ0, φ
′
0)≺ψ0
(ψ0, φ0) is a prefer-
ence cycle. Let ψN := ψ0 and φN := φ
′
0. Then ψ := (ψ0, . . . , ψN) is a closed N-
chain carrying the preference chain ξ := [(ψ0, φ0)
ψ0
(ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN)]. Since
Ψ is simply connected, the chain ψ is homotopic to a trivial chain (ψ0, ψ0, . . . , ψ0),
and by Lemma 8.7, this homotopy transforms the preference chain ξ into a preference
chain (ψ0, φ0)
ψ0
(ψ0, φˆ1)
ψ0
(ψ0, φˆ2)
ψ0
· · · 
ψ0
(ψ0, φˆN−1)
ψ0
(ψN , φN) = (ψ0, φ
′
0). Thus, we have
(ψ0, φ0)
ψ0
(ψ0, φ
′
0) because (ψ0
) is transitive. But this contradicts our hypothesis that
(ψ0, φ
′
0)≺ψ0
(ψ0, φ0).
By contradiction, no such preference cycle can exist. 2
Proof of Proposition 7.5. Let (
RO
) be the join of {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ. Then (
RO
) is a preorder on
Ψ× Φ.
(b) Lemma 8.8 implies that (
RO
) satisfies axiom (W1). It remains only to show that (
RO
)
is a complete order (and hence, satisfies (W2)).
Let (ψ, φ), (ψ′, φ′) ∈ Ψ × Φ; we must show these two points are comparable. Since N
chain-connects Ψ, there is an N-chain ψ = ψ0, ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψN = ψ
′ connecting ψ to ψ′.
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Now, for all n ∈ [0...N) the relation (
ψn
) is indifference-connected, so we can construct
an indifference chain (ψ, φ) = (ψ0, φ0)≈
ψ0
(ψ1, φ1)≈
ψ1
· · · ≈
ψN−1
(ψN , φN) = (ψ
′, φN), for some
φN ∈ Φ. Thus, (ψ, φ)≈
RO
(ψ′, φN). But (
ψ′
) is a complete ordering of Φ, so either φN
ψ′
φ′ or
φN 
ψ′
φ′; thus, either (ψ′, φN)
RO
(ψ′, φ′) or (ψ′, φN) 
RO
(ψ′, φ′); thus, either (ψ, φ)
RO
(ψ′, φ′)
or (ψ, φ) 
RO
(ψ′, φ′), because (ψ, φ)≈
RO
(ψ′, φN) and (
RO
) is transitive by construction.
(a) We must show that () satisfies (W1) and (W2).
(W1) By hypothesis, we can extend each local relation (
ψ
) to some indifference-
connected relation (ˆ
ψ
), such that the system {Nψ, ˆ
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ still satisfies axiom (RO).
Now apply part (b) to {ˆ
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ to obtain a global wipo (ˆ
RO
). If (
RO
) is the join of
{
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ, then (ˆ
RO
) extends (
RO
). Thus, for each ψ ∈ Ψ, the relation (
RO
) agrees with (
ψ
)
on {ψ} × Φ, because (ˆ
RO
) agrees with (
ψ
) on {ψ} × Φ, by part (b).
(W2) Let ψ, ψ′ ∈ Ψ and φ ∈ Φ; we must find some φ′ ∈ Φ such that (ψ, φ)
RO
(ψ′, φ′). Let
ψ = ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψN = ψ
′ be an N-chain (this exists because N chain-connects Ψ). There
exists φ1 ∈ Φ with (ψ, φ)
ψ
(ψ1, φ1), because (
ψ
) is a wipo on Nψ ×Φ. Next, there exists
φ2 ∈ Φ with (ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
(ψ2, φ2), because (
ψ1
) is a wipo on Nψ1×Φ. Proceeding inductively,
we obtain a preference chain (ψ, φ)
ψ0
(ψ1, φ1)
ψ1
· · · 
ψN−1
(ψN , φN). Let φ
′ := φN ; then
(ψ, φ)
RO
(ψ′, φ′). It follows that (
RO
) is a wipo. 2
Proof of Proposition 7.6. For every ψ ∈ Ψ, find some j ∈ J with ψ ∈ Oj. The open set
Oj contains an open ball around ψ, and if this open ball is small enough, it is simply
connected (because Ψ is a manifold). Thus, let Nψ ⊂ Oj be some simply connected
open neighbourhood of ψ, and let uψ be the restriction of uj to Nψ × Φ. This yields a
simply connected neighbourhood system N = {Nψ}ψ∈Ψ, as in Example 7.4(a).
For every ψ ∈ Ψ, define a ‘local’ wipo (
ψ
) on Nψ×Φ as follows: for all (ν0, φ0), (ν1, φ1) ∈
Nψ × Φ,(
(ν0, φ0)
ψ
(ν1, φ1)
)
⇐⇒
(
∃ improvement path γ : [0, 1]−→Nψ × Φ
with γ(0) = (ν0, φ0) and γ(1) = (ν1, φ1)
)
.
Thus, (
;
) is obtained by taking the join of all the local wipos {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ, exactly as in the
definition of (
RO
) in §7.3. Thus, it suffices to show that the system {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ is consistent,
and then invoke Proposition 7.5(a).
Let ψ ∈ Ψ. Define (ˆ
ψ
) on Nψ × Φ as follows: for all (ν0, φ0), (ν1, φ1) ∈ Nψ × Φ,(
(ν0, φ0)ˆ
ψ
(ν1, φ1)
)
⇐⇒
(
uψ(ν0, φ0) ≤ uψ(ν1, φ1)
)
. (36)
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Clearly, (ˆ
ψ
) is a complete order onNψ×Φ. Axiom (Sm1) ensures that (ˆ
ψ
) is indifference-
connected.
Claim 1: The system {Nψ, ˆ
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ satisfies property (RO) from §7.3.
Proof. Let ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Ψ. Suppose Nψ1 ∩ Nψ2 6= ∅, and the relations (ˆ
ψ1
) and (ˆ
ψ2
) are
defined by (36). Suppose uψ1 is the restriction of uj to Nψ1 and uψ2 is the restriction
of uk to Nψ2 , for some j, k ∈ J . Thus, Oj ∩Ok 6= ∅ (since it contains Nψ1 ∩Nψ2), and
then property (Sm3) ensures that (ˆ
ψ1
) and (ˆ
ψ2
) agree on Nψ1 ∩Nψ2 . 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: For any ψ ∈ Ψ, the preorder (ˆ
ψ
) extends (
ψ
).
Proof. Let (ν0, φ0), (ν1, φ1) ∈ Nψ × Φ, with (ν0, φ0)
ψ
(ν1, φ1); we must show that
(ν0, φ0)ˆ
ψ
(ν1, φ1). But if (ν0, φ0)
ψ
(ν1, φ1), then there is some improvement path γ :
[0, 1]−→Nψ × Φ with γ(0) = (ν0, φ0) and γ(1) = (ν1, φ1). Thus,
uψ(ν1, φ1) = uψ◦γ(1) (∗) uψ◦γ(0)+
∫ 1
0
(uψ◦γ)
′(t) dt ≥
(†)
uψ◦γ(0) = uψ(ν0, φ0),
so (ν0, φ0)ˆ
ψ
(ν1, φ1), as desired.
Here, (∗) is the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus. Inequality (†) is because (uψ◦γ)
′(t)
(c)
∇uψ(γ(t))[γ
′(t)] ≥
(⋄)
0 for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Here, (c) is by the Chain Rule, and (⋄) is
by (Sm2) and the fact that γ′(t) ~
γ(t)
~0γ(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1] (because γ is an improvement
path). 3 Claim 2
Thus, the system {
ψ
}ψ∈Ψ is consistent, so Proposition 7.5(a) implies that (
;
) is a wipo.
2
Remark. In the proof of Proposition 7.6, the inequality uψ(ν0, φ0) ≤ uψ(ν1, φ1)
is necessary, but not sufficient to conclude that (ν0, φ0)
;
(ν1, φ1). Thus, assuming the
existence of a function uψ : Nψ ×Φ−→R is not tantamount to assuming some ‘local’ form
of ‘ordinal, fully comparable’ utility functions —it is a much weaker assumption.
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